

1974

YEAR
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FILE No. NBR 10/11 PART B

SECURITY GRADING

N.B. The
UPGRAD

Contents checked
for transfer to
D.R.O.

(Sgd.)

Date

23

2/11/74

H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

DEPT.
or POST

FILE No.

NBR 10/11

(Part B)

(101) - 200

TITLE:

ARMS SALES FROM UK TO IRAQ

REFER TO

REFER TO

REFER TO

NAME

(and dept. when necessary)

TO
SEE:

DATE

NAME

(and dept. when necessary)

TO
SEE:

DATE

NAME


(and dept. when necessary)

TO
SEE:

DATE

FCO 8/2322

W418



Registry Address

30/50/50

SECURITY
N.B. The
UPGRAD

HPW 145245

YEAR STAMP

1974

PRIORITY

CYPHER CAT A

TOP COPY

FM TEHRAN 191100Z AUG

27
JNR 10/1

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 451 OF 19 AUG/⁷⁴RPTD FOR INFO
TO ROUTINE KUWAIT, BAGHDAD, JEDDA AND MOD (FOR HDS).

YOUR TEL NO 331 : ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

90

1. AT MY AUDIENCE WITH THE SHAH ON 17 AUGUST I SPOKE ON THE LINE OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO 322. I ADDED THAT I WAS WUITE SURE THAT HMG WOULD DO NOTHING WHICH WOULD INCREASE IRAQ'S AGRRESSIVE CAPABILITY VIS-A-VIS IRAN OR THE GULF STATES OR WHICH WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THEIR CAPABILITY TO SUBDUE THE KURDS BY FORCE. HOWEVER, APART FROM THE OBVIOUS COMMERCIAL BENEFIT FROM ANY ARMS SALES, SLIGHT THOUGH THIS WOULD BE IN THE CASE OF WHAT WE WERE CONSIDERING FOR IRAQ, THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE IN MAKING A START TOWARDS BREAKING THE EXISTING SOVIET MONOPOLY OVER THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES. WHAT DID THE SHAH THINK ?

2. THE SHAH SAID THAT, IF I HAD ASKED HIM THE SAME QUESTION SOME TIME AGO, HE WOULD HAVE GIVEN ME A NEGATIVE ANSWER. HOWEVER, IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, HE SAW NO PROBLEM IN WHAT WE WERE PROPOSING. HE TOOK MY POINT ABOUT TRYING TO ERODE THE SOVIET POSITION. IN ANY CASE, NOW THAT THE IRAQIS HAD SCUD MISSILES, TU 22 BOMBERS AND MIG 23S, THE ADDITION OF A FEW CYMBELINES AND HAWKS WOULD MAKE NO DIFFERENCE TO THEIR CAPABILITY. IF WE DID NOT SELL THEM THESE ITEMS, THE FRENCH OR THE RUSSIANS WOULD SELL THEM THE EQUIVALENTS. HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE US GET THE BUSINESS IF ANYONE DID.

3. THERE WAS NO HESITATION IN THE SHAH'S MANNER AND I AM SURE WE CAN TAKE WHAT HE SAID AT FACE VALUE. I SHOULD NEVERTHELESS LIKE TO KEEP HIM INFORMED OF THE OUTCOME

/OF THE CURRENT

CONFIDENTIAL

OF THE CURRENT EXERCISE AND TO INFORM HIM OF ANY SIGNIFICANT
FUTURE REQUESTS IN ADVANCE OF A DECISION.
HIS FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE IN THE PRESENT TWO CASES SHOULD
NOT BE TAKEN TO IMPLY THAT HE WILL ALWAYS AGREE WITH WESTERN
ARMS SALES PROPOSALS TO IRAQ, ESPECIALLY IF THE VOLUME OF SUCH
PROPOSALS OR THE SOPHISTICATION OF THE EQUIPMENT INVOLVED
SHOULD INCREASE.

PARSONS

/SENT TO D C C/

F I L E S

MED
DEFENCE D

COPIES TO:

DS 13)
SALES 1B) M O D

102

Mr Campbell

Mr Coles

Minute

JB
23/iiiRECEIVED
RECEIVED
27 AUG 1981
NBR 191

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ

PROBLEM

- A (101) 1. The Shah has told HM Ambassador, Tehran that he sees no problem over our supplying 12 Cymbeline Radar and 30 Hawk aircraft to Iraq. The proposed sale of Hawk can now therefore be approved, but we have to reach a decision on Cymbeline.

BACKGROUND

- B (86) 2. DOPC colleagues have concurred with the Secretary of State's recommendation that, whilst he would be inclined to supply the Hawk aircraft to Iraq if the Iranians did not raise objections, a conclusion on the sale of Cymbeline should be deferred until the Shah had been sounded. In both cases the Kuwaitis were to be informed but, in concurring with the Secretary of State's paper, the Secretary of State for Defence expressed reservations about informing the Kuwaitis during current arms sales negotiations with Kuwait. In subsequent discussions with the MOD, it was agreed therefore that discretion on when to inform the Kuwaitis might be left to HM Ambassador in Kuwait.

ARGUMENT

3. The way is therefore clear for the supply of Hawk. We know that there is no problem from the Shah's point of view on the supply of Cymbeline, but do we want to supply this equipment? The Secretary of State, in consulting his DOPC colleagues, expressed his inclination to refuse because of the possibility that this mortar-locating radar could be of significant use in the present Iraqi campaign against the Kurds, which virtually amounts to civil war. There is therefore the possibility on this count that the sale would attract some public and Parliamentary criticism in this country.

4. On the other hand HMG agreed with EMI, the manufacturers of Cymbeline, that as a condition of its development they would support export sales. The firm are alive to the implications of this agreement and have recently pressed MOD(Sales) specifically on the Iraqi deal, which would be worth £4 million to them.

/5....

103
125


- 2 -

5. Although there is a possibility that the eventual use of Cymbeline in the Kurdish context might give rise to some criticism, we are far from being a significant arms supplier to Iraq, coming well after the USSR, France and India. In any case, the Ministry of Defence have told us that Cymbeline would not be delivered to Iraq before late 1976: allowing time for training, the equipment could not therefore be brought into service until some time in 1977. Bearing these considerations (including the Shah's reactions) in mind and taking into account the pressure from the manufacturers to promote the export of Cymbeline, I think that the balance of the argument lies in favour of agreeing to this sale.

RECOMMENDATION

6. I recommend therefore that we should agree to the supply of Cymbeline as well as the Hawk to Iraq and that MOD(Sales) should inform the manufacturers, asking them not to promote any publicity for either sale. If this is agreed, HM Ambassador in Tehran, Jedda and Kuwait should be informed appropriately.

7. NENAD, Defence Department and MOD concur.



P R H Wright
Middle East Department


21 August 1974

cc: NENAD

Defence Department

I agree. But perhaps the Ministry of State might wish to get the Sqs agreement in view of his earlier talks about Cymbeline.

CONFIDENTIAL



2/8

Enter - Remit soon
with pps.

Mr. [unclear] 27/8

CONFIDENTIAL

M. days - [unclear] r. [unclear] [unclear]
[unclear] of [unclear].

MR WRIGHT (MED)

c.c. Mr Campbell
NENAD
Defence Department

[Signature] 27/8

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ

The Minister of State has seen your submission of 21 August
and has commented :-

"It would be entirely in line with the DOPC paper that,
now that the Shah has expressed his view, we should
authorise the sale of Cymbeline as well as Hawk. This
is especially so since it would not come into service
before 1977.

I do not think we need trouble the S of S further.
Therefore proceed as proposed. D.E."

[Signature]
B J BAXTER

Assistant Private Secretary to
Mr Ennals

23 August 1974

draft submitted
28/8 p.9.

see
104

125 refs

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
Confidential

✓ (104)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-



H Braden Esq
Ministry of Defence (DS 13)
Main Building
Whitehall
SW1

Your reference

Our reference

Date 28 August 1974

Dear Hugh.

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ

(86)

1. As you know, Ministers agreed the recommendation in OPD(74)27 on defence sales policy for Iraq and the Shah has subsequently told HM Ambassador, Tehran, that he sees no problem over our supplying 12 Cymbeline radars and 30 Hawk aircraft to Iraq (Tehran tel no 451). FCO Ministers have now confirmed that both these sales may proceed, bearing in mind our understanding that Cymbeline would not be delivered to Iraq before late 1976, and would not therefore be in service before 1977.

2. The way is therefore clear for MOD Sales to inform the manufacturers of the above items that they may now proceed with their negotiations with the Iraq Government. For obvious reasons, we should be grateful if you could ensure that the firms are asked not to promote any publicity for either sale.

3. We now propose to inform HM Chargé d'Affaires Baghdad and HM Ambassador Tehran of Ministers' decision by telegram. I attach the proposed drafts. On the question of informing the Kuwait Government I understand that you have agreed with Peter Raftery that we should leave HM Ambassador Kuwait discretion when to take this action while stressing the relevance of current arms sales negotiations with that country. I attach a further proposed draft telegram to Kuwait. Would you be so good as to let us have your clearance for the above draft telegrams as soon as possible as the Iraqis may enquire about our decision at any time?

X

James L. Smith

P R H Wright
Middle East Department

Prinching

cc Mr Jackson, Defence Dept
Mr Craig, NENAD

Enc

CONFIDENTIAL

*pu Tels to await
18/9 X.*

*ni Braden rang to say no
comment, tele may be one.
Tels sent 28.9/9*

PRIORITY
 CYPHER/CAT A
 GRPS 120
 FM F C O 021515Z

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN
 REGISTRY No 35

3 SEP 1974

NBR10/1

1974

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TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 220 OF 2 SEPTEMBER INFO
 TEHRAN KUWAIT JEDDA.

TEHRAN TELEGRAM NO 451: ARMS SALES TO IRAQ

1. MINISTERS HAVE APPROVED THE SUPPLY OF BOTH HAWK AND CYMBELINE TO IRAQ. MOD (SALES) ARE NOW INFORMING THE MANUFACTURERS THAT THEY MAY PROCEED WITH THEIR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT AND ASKING THEM NOT TO SEEK PUBLICITY FOR EITHER SALE.
2. WE HAVE CONSIDERED INFORMING THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT BUT HAVE CONCLUDED THAT WHILE THERE MIGHT BE IMMEDIATE POLITICAL ADVANTAGE, IT COULD MAKE IT MOST DIFFICULT IF A FUTURE SALES REQUEST HAS TO BE REFUSED. WE WOULD PREFER TO LEAVE IT TO THE IRAQIS TO LEARN THE NEWS FROM THE MANUFACTURERS IN THE USUAL WAY.
3. WE WOULD THEREFORE PREFER THAT YOU SHOULD VOLUNTEER NOTHING TO THE IRAQIS ON THIS SUBJECT. IF ASKED, YOU MAY TELL THEM THAT THEY CAN EXPECT TO HEAR SOON FROM THE MANUFACTURERS.


CALLAGHAN

FILES
 M E D
 DEFENCE DEPT
 PRIVATE SECRETARY
 P.S./MR ENNALS
 PS/PUS
 MR CAMPBELL
 SIR G ARTHUR

COPIES TO
 DS 13 MOD

MOD SALES 1B

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

GPS 25

CYPHER/CAT A

FM FCO 021515Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE TEHRAN TELNO 368 OF 2 SEPTEMBER 1974 INFO SAVING
BAGHDAD KUWAIT JEDDA.

YOUR TEL NO 451: ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

1. YOUR PARAGRAPH 3. I AGREE. YOU WILL BE INFORMED IF FOLLOWING
THE DECISIONS ON HAWK AND CYMBELINE (MY TELNO 220 TO BAGHDAD)
ANY CONTRACT IS SIGNED.

CALLAGHAN

FILES

MED

DEFENCE D

MR CAMPBELL

SIR G ARTHUR

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DS 13 MOD

SALES 1B MOD

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CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

GRPS 150

FROM F.C.O. 021520Z

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 3 SEP 1974 71BR 10/1

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TO ROUTINE KUWAIT TELNO. 254 OF 2 SEPTEMBER 1974 INFO SAVING TO
BAGHDAD TEHRAN AND JEDDA.

YOUR TELNO. 475 : ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.


1. I AGREE THAT WE SHOULD INFORM THE KUWAITIS ABOUT OUR DECISIONS ON DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ BEFORE THERE IS ANY DANGER OF THESE BECOMING PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE. WE WILL LET YOU KNOW IF AS A RESULT OF DECISIONS ON CYMBELINE AND HAWK SALES TO IRAQ (MY TELNO. 220 TO BAGHDAD) ANY CONTRACT IS EVENTUALLY SIGNED.
2. THE TIMING OF ANY APPROACH TO THE KUWAITIS IS IMPORTANT AS M O D (SALES) ARE ANXIOUS NOT TO PUT AT ANY RISK THEIR ALREADY DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE KUWAITIS OVER JAGUAR AND CHIEFTAIN. WE WILL THEREFORE LEAVE IT TO YOUR DISCRETION TO SPEAK TO THE KUWAITIS WHEN YOU JUDGE THE TIME TO BE RIGHT IN ALL RESPECTS.

CALLAGHAN

FILES
M E D
DEFENCE DEPT
MR CAMPBELL
SIR G ARTHUR

COPIES TO
MOD DS 13
MOD(SALES 1B)

CONFIDENTIAL



**PRIORITY
ADVANCE COPY**

~~MED~~

Def. D (2)

ZCZCDFA121
 DSAO-T-PP BRIT EMB BAGHDAD
 DSAO-T-PP FCO (MED)
 DE RBDWC 0504 2461828
 PRIORITY 031315Z SEP
 FM MODUK
 TO BRIT EMB BAGHDAD
 INFO FCO (MED)

BT

R E S T R I C T E D
D I G E B R

FROM CAMERON FOR SANDERS PD YOU WILL BY NOW HAVE SEEN PARAGRAPH TWO OF FCO TEL NO 220 TO YOU AND MY SIGNAL 021630 SEP PD YOU WILL NO DOUBT MAKE PIT QUITE CLEAR WHEN YOU SPEAK TO GENERAL JENAB THAT YOU ARE MERELY PASSING A MESSAGE FROM EMH PD EMJ WILL BE ASKED TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO BAGHDAD PD WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS

BT

*noted & referred to
 Mr. Williams - a not too
 helpful attempt to remedy
 the situation
 Mr. Williams - 4/9*

(2x)

[files]

NNNN

*R @ 9041 2/83
 [signature]*



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE DS13b
Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON S.W.1A 2HB
Telephone: WHITEhall 7022, ext.

109

6 SEP 1974

MBR10/1

Our reference: D/DS13/178

Your reference:

P R H Wright Esq
Middle East Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street, SW1

3 September 1974

Dear Mr Wright

A. Lighter^{N4}/9

pa

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ

1. In Hugh Braden's absence I am replying to your letter of 28 August.

2. This is to confirm my telephone call to your Department today saying that we had no comments on the draft telegrams that you propose to send to Baghdad, Tehran and Kuwait.

Yours faithfully

A. B. Payle

A B PAYLE
DS13b

CONFIDENTIAL

W. Raftery to see

Her [Signature] 110
12/9

GR 120

PRIORITY

CYPHER CAT. A

FM BAGHDAD 100830Z

CONFIDENTIAL

REC 1 IN REG 1 IN 35 12 SEP 1974 MBR 10/1

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 324 OF 10 SEPTEMBER. 1974.

INFO ROUTINE TO KUWAIT TEHRAN AND JEDDA.

YOUR TEL NO 220: ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

1. THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUMMONED ME ON 9 SEPTEMBER TO ENQUIRE WHETHER IRAQ'S REQUEST FOR CYMBELINE HAD BEEN APPROVED. I SAID THAT I UNDERSTOOD REPRESENTATIVES OF EMI WERE ABOUT TO GET IN TOUCH WITH IRAQI MINISTRY OF DEFENCE. MY OWN INFORMATION WAS THAT THE SALE WOULD GO AHEAD. I POINTED OUT THAT, AS HE WOULD UNDERSTAND, ALL BRITISH ARMS SALES TO THE MIDDLE EAST WERE CONSIDERED ON THEIR MERITS AND, REGRETTABLY, WE COULD NOT GUARANTEE THAT ALL FUTURE REQUESTS FOR ARMS WOULD BE APPROVED.

MINISTER SAID HE ENTIRELY UNDERSTOOD AND WAS VERY PLEASED AT DECISION ON CYMBELINE.

GIDDENS

FILES
MED
DEFENCE D
PS
PS/MR ENNALS
PS/PUS
MR CAMPBELL
SIR G ARTHUR

COPIES TO:
DS13 MOD
MOD SALES 1B

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~~FO 569/E 003/11~~

~~LKS NR 120/11~~

~~RR MODUK~~

RR FCO

RR NENAD

GR 70

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 110500Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE MODUK TEL NO DIGEBR OF 11 SEPTEMBER INFO FCO AND NENAD.

FROM DA FOR CAMERON.

MILITARY ENGINEER STORES.

YOUR EBR 060930Z AUG PARA 4 REFERS.

ONE. MINE EXPLoder. " SPECIAL ROLLERS OR CHAINS HOOKED
IN FRONT OF A TANK DESIGNED TO CLEAR A PATH THROUGH A MINFIELD
FOR PASSAGE OF TRACKED AND WHEELED VEHICLES "

TWO. MECHANICAL MINE LAYER. " TO LAY ANTI-TANK MINES MECHANICALLY
AND PROVIDE CAMOUFLAGE DURING LAYING WITH MINIMUM SOIL WORK,,

GIDDENS

BT

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11 SEP 1974
MBR10/1

LA. K2/9

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K124/MED

NENAD.

SENT TO D.C.C.

Reference

MBR10/1

Mr. Rafferty
MC)

now I am the f.p. phase.

(98) & (76)

1.379

IRAO Supply of Gun spares.

Defense Sales Supply have reminded me that they wrote on 9 April to obtain clearance to supply 5.5 mm & 35 pounder gun spares to Iraq (their reference is D/Sales/503/10/12).

I should be grateful for your comments in the light of the recent Ministerial decision on arms sales to Iraq.

Min the Intosh.

(98) from the 25 p.m. I don't

MRM Custod.
dy. sent 9/6/74.

know anything about the 5.5 mm guns. I shall 16/9

FO NR 163/9 E NR 5/9
LKS NR 690/08

RR MODUK

GRS 135

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 080915Z SEPT.

SECRET

TO ROUTINE MODUK TEL OF 8 SEPTEMBER 1974.

DIG EBR.
FOR BRITAIN.
FROM SANDERS.

MARCONI IN IRAQ. MY 10/7 OF 15 MAY. AND YOUR D/SALES/113/48/3
OF 30 MAY REFERS.

1. VISITED TODAY BY LINNEL ON THIRD VISIT FROM BEIRUT SINCE
REFS.
2. IRAQIS PRESSING FOR ANSWER ON ZB 298. APPROX REQUIRMENT
IS FOR 24 COMPLETE SETS WITH VEHICLES VALUE APPROX THREE
QUARTERS MILLIONS POUNDS.
3. FRENCH FIRM LABOURATOIRE CENTRAL DE TELECOMMS HAVE
TENDERED WITH RASIT 72A (RAPIERE) A SIMILAR EQPT AT A HIGHER
PRICE.
4. IN VIEW OF SHAHS RECENT REACTIONS AND MARCONIS DESIRE TO
BREAK INTO THIS MARKET WITH THIS AND OTHER EQUIP MAY WE PLEASE
HAVE A QUICK REACTION FROM YOU.
5. DETAILS OF OTHER IRAQI REQUESTS TO MARCONI INVOLVING
HF COMMS INSTALLATION (£50,000), UHF TROPO COMMS (£1 1/2 M)
AND TWO OTHER POSSIBILITIES INVOLVING (£2M) WILL FOLLOW
BY BAG.

GIDDEN3
BT

112

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MOD DISTRIBUTION

REC'D

Enter

W. Raftery 9/9

Mr. Williams 9/9

W. J. Ma.

GR 80

EN CLAIR

FM BAGHDAD 161040Z

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
17 SEP 1974
MBR10/1

h' Rafferty
 Para 2 - not possible.
 I hope. Cd you speak
 MOD. 13/9

UNCLASSIFIED

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK TEL NO DIG EBR OF 16 SEPTEMBER/1974 INFO FCO MED.

FROM DA FOR BRITAIN.

1. CYMBELINE. BROOKS EMI ARRIVED BAGHDAD 15 SEPTEMBER, FINISHED CONTRACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS TODAY AND CONTRACT WILL BE SIGNED TOMORROW.

2. CAN YOU LET US KNOW HOW AND IF THE 18 MONTH RULE WILL BE APPLIED. THERE IS A STRONG REQUEST FROM IRAQIS TO HAVE TWO EQUIPMENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOR INITIAL TRG. A QUICK ANSWER WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

3. YOUR EBR 031315Z SEP HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH THROUGHOUT

GIDDENS.

FILES

MED
 DEFENCE DEPT
 MR CAMPBELL
 MR WEIR
 MR THOMSON

Telegram mr

1A. Q 7/9



RESTRICTED

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED IN
REGISTER No 35

17 SEP 1974

A B Fayle Esq
Ministry of Defence (DS13B)
Main Building
Whitehall
LONDON SW1

Your reference

Our reference NBR 10/1

Date 16 September 1974

Mr Lip,

1A. 17/9.

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ

1 I should be grateful if you would arrange for an assessment to be made of the significance in the context of paragraph 7 of OPD(74)27 of the equipment referred to in the attached copy of a letter from the Department of Trade.

Yours,

W. A. Raftery

P A Raftery
Middle East Department

cc: Ministry of Defence (Sales 1b)
Export Licensing Branch, Dept of Trade

RESTRICTED

TOP COPY

GR 80

EN CLAIR

FM BAGHDAD 161040Z

UNCLASSIFIED

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
18 SEP 1974
MBR10/1

E+1A

R 18/9

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK TEL NO DIG EBR OF 16 SEPTEMBER/1974 INFO FCO MED.

FROM DA FOR BRITAIN.

1. CYMBELINE. BROOKS EMI ARRIVED BAGHDAD 15 SEPTEMBER, FINISHED CONTRACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS TODAY AND CONTRACT WILL BE SIGNED TOMORROW.

2. CAN YOU LET US KNOW HOW AND IF THE 18 MONTH RULE WILL BE APPLIED. THERE IS A STRONG REQUEST FROM IRAQIS TO HAVE TWO EQPOIPNENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOR INTITIAL TRG. A QUICK ANSWER WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

3. YOUR EBR 031315Z SEP HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH THROUGHOUT

GIDDENS

FILES

MED
DEFENCE DEPT
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR
MR THOMSON

Telegram sent. I have asked Mr. Grossman of Sales to be keeping touch with RMI so that we may inform them / Kuwait once the contract has been signed.

R. 18/9

TOP COPY

P.A. K 18/9

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 110
IMMEDIATE
CYPHER/CAT A

FM FCO 171530Z



CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELNO 235 OF 17 SEPTEMBER. 1974.

YOUR TEL TO MODUK NO DIG EBR OF 16 SEPTEMBER: ARMS SALES TO
IRAQ.

1. TO MAINTAIN THE LINE IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF OUR TEL NO 220
THE DEFENCE ATTACHE. SHOULD LEAVE EMI TO DEAL WITH THE IRAQIS DIRECT
ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE CYMBELINE CONTRACT, INCLUDING DELIVERY AND
TRAINING. IF ASKED, HE SHOULD SAY THAT IT IS NOT THE NORMAL
PRACTICE FOR HMG TO BECOME INVOLVED IN THE DETAILS OF A GOVERNMENT-
TO-FIRM TRANSACTION.
2. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION ONLY; THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE REQUIRE
THAT CYMBELINE SHOULD NOT BE DELIVERED TO IRAQ UNTIL LATE 1976.
ALLOWING TIME FOR TRAINING, THE EQUIPMENT SHOULD NOT THEREFORE
COME INTO SERVICE UNTIL 1977, A FACTOR WHICH WAS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT
WHEN THE SALE WAS AGREED, GIVEN THE IMPLICATIONS OF CYMBELINE
IN THE KURDISH CONTEXT.

CALLAGHAN

F I L E S

MED
DEFENCE D
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR
MR THOMSON

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DS 13
SALES 1B } M O D

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

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REGISTRY No 35
20 SEP 1974
Your reference
Our reference NBR 10/1
Date 19 September 1974

(118)

A B Fayle Esq
Ministry of Defence (DS13b)
Main Building
Whitehall
LONDON SW1

1A. 8/8/74
Noted 24/9/74
by N. in to 2 weeks by
min. 24/9/74

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ

1 I should be grateful if you would arrange for an assessment to be made of the significance in the context of paragraph 7 of OPD(74)27 of the equipment referred to in the attached copy of Export Licence Application 1A/3604/74 from the Department of Trade.

2 Would you please also arrange for a check to be made on the statement by Plessey that the equipment in question has been supplied to Libya and Syria; we would be particularly interested to know the date of supply.

P A Raftery
Middle East Department

cc: MOD Sales 1b

Export Licensing Branch, Dept of Trade

RESTRICTED

(119)

15167

CLASSIFIED IN
REGISTRATION No 35
23 SEP 1974
NBR 10/1

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VZCZCZCDFA 106
DSAO-T-RR-BRITDEFAD BAGHDAD
-T-RR-FCOMED

DE RBDWC 0100 2631158

ROUTINE 200825Z SEP

FM MODUK

TO BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD

INFO FCO (MED)

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

DIG EBR/LPE

FROM SALES 1 B PD MARCONI PD RE YOUR 080915Z SEPT AND 10/31 OF
10 SEPT PD REGRET SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS PREVENT SUPPLY OF
ZB298 TO IRAQ PD TANK GUN STABILISATION KITS ALSO RULED OUT AS
BEING TOO CONTENTIOUS PD CLEARANCES FOR OTHER ITEMS NOW BEING
PROCESSED PD GRATEFUL YOU ADVISE US OF FM EQUIPMENT MODEL NUMBER
BT

Mr. Kaffery 23/9
Mr. Burke 20/9
EHLA

NNNN

LH 384E




MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation

Sales 1b

Stuart House 23 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ

Telex 23605

 Telephone 01-437-9288 ext. Direct Line L 01-632-4709
 Switchboard : 01-632-3333


Enter 2279 (120)

 Miss M R McIntosh
 Defence Department
 Foreign & Commonwealth Office
 Downing Street
 London SW1

Your reference

Our reference

 D/Sales/113/48/3
 D/Sales/113/18/1

Date

23 September 1974

Dear Miss McIntosh

ARMS WORKING PARTY CLEARANCES

Could we have an indication of your Department's view to the sale of the equipment described below please?

1. Country: Iraq.
2. Description of equipment: Communications Systems.
 - (a) Clansman UK/VRC 353/4: a VHF vehicle radio, designed primarily for armoured vehicles but also suitable for soft-skinned vehicles or fixed or mobile ground stations.
 - (b) Transportable Tropospheric System: a mobile, multi-channel tropospheric scatter communications system.
3. Security Classification of equipment. Unclassified.
4. Value of sale.
 - a) Clansman: 100 Sets £2 million. ✓
 - b) Tropo: 4-6 Mobile stations £1½ million. ✓
5. Further information. The equipment manufacturer is (a) Marconi Space and Defence Systems Ltd; (b) Marconi Communication Systems Ltd.

I am copying this letter to the other members of the AWP.


Yours

D A GROSSMAN

 Hello to me!
 Nicky of 10 re.
 Min the letter.

No objection.

4/1/74


 Copies to: Mr H R Braden - DS13
 Mr M Esau - DS13b
 Mr W P Casell - Treasury
 Mr P T Durnell - DoT (EPB)
 Lt Col C W A Napier - DPS (C team)

- ① Enter M.E.D.
- ② Mr Rafferty M.E.D.

Any objections to the sale of this equipment?

24.9.74

GRS 320
PRIORITY
CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY (21)

RECEIVED IN
N 35
10/11
10/11/74

FM BAGHDAD 251015Z SEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 342 OF 25 SEPTEMBER 1974.

YOUR TEL NO 235 : ARMS SALES TO IRAQ,

1. I AGREE THAT WE SHOULD AVOID INVOLVEMENT IN DETAILED DISCUSSION OF CONTRACTS FOR ARMS SALES, BUT WHERE THESE REQUIRE GOVERNMENT APPROVAL, AS IN THE CASE OF CYMBELINE, WE ARE INVOLVED (AND SEEN BY THE IRAQIS TO BE INVOLVED) WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR NOT.

2. I AM CONCERNED THAT, IN THE CYMBELINE CONTRACT, WE MAY LAY OURSELVES OPEN TO CHARGES OF BEING LESS THAN STRAIGHT FORWARD. HMG HAVE APPROVED THE SALE AND, ON THAT BASIS, A CONTRACT HAS BEEN NEGOTIATED BETWEEN EMI AND THE IRAQIS. ARTICLE 19 MAKES IT QUITE CLEAR THAT THE DATE OF DELIVERY IS DEPENDENT UPON THE ISSUE OF AN EXPORT LICENCE BY HMG. THE IRAQIS MUST EXPECT THAT THIS WILL NOT BE LONG DELAYED AND WILL CERTAINLY BE ISSUED TO PERMIT DELIVERY CONSIDERABLY BEFORE LATE 1976.

3. THE (MILITARY) DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF FOR OPERATIONAL EQUIPMENT AKSED ON 24 SEPTEMBER TO BE INFORMED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHEN LICENCE IS LIKELY TO BE ISSUED AND WHETHER OR NOT THERE WOULD BE A RESTRICTION ON THE DATE OF FIRST DELIVERY. GIVEN THE MINISTERIAL INTEREST IN THIS CONTRACT, THEY ARE BOUND TO REACT WHEN THE DATE OF DELIVERY BECOMES APPARENT. IT WOULD SEEM, THEREFORE, TO BE IN OUR INTEREST THAT HEY SHOULD BE MADE AWARE OF THE POSITION IN CLEAR TERMS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BUT MEANWHILE I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO LEARN MOD'S REASONS FOR REQUIRING THAT DELIVERY BE DELAYED UNTIL LATE 1976, GIVEN :

125 refers

CONFIDENTIAL

/(A)

CONFIDENTIAL

(A) OUR UNDERSTANDING (FROM EMI) THAT CYMBELINE IS NOW BEING SUPPLIED TO EGYPT, WHICH IF CORRECT WILL BE KNOWN TO THE IRAQIS AND

(B) IF THE '18 MONTH RULE' IS APPLIED, THE DATE OF DELIVERY SHOULD BE NOT LATER THAN DECEMBER 1975.

GIDDENS

FILES
MED
DEFENCE DEPT
MR CAMPBELL
MR THOMSON

COPIES TO
DS 13 MOD
SALES 1 B MOD

2
CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 38

30 SEP 1974

NBR 10/1

LOOSE MINUTE

D/DS 13/178E

DPS(C Team)

Copies to:

PS/HDS

MD/HDS

AUS(Sales)

Head of DIS(CS)

D Sales 1

D Sales Supply

AD Sales lb

FCO (Def Dept)

FCO (MED)

DOT (ELB)

27/9

N. Clark 27/9

N. Ryan

W.A. 27/9

IRAQ - SALE OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT

1. The Defence and Oversea Policy Committee recently agreed proposals contained in a memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, concerning the supply of British made defence equipment to Iraq.

2. While recognising the attractive commercial possibilities associated with Iraq's large oil reserves the Foreign Secretary drew attention to the political problems which might arise and in particular to the possible adverse reactions from Iran and Kuwait, two countries in which we have a major economic and commercial interest.

3. The Committee accordingly decided that HMG's policy should continue to be very restrictive towards Iraq, limiting supplies to minor equipment and paying close attention to Iranian and Kuwaiti susceptibilities. It further agreed that no equipment should be supplied which might significantly increase Iraqi capabilities in any future conflict with Israel. In reaching this conclusion the Committee decided to refuse export licences for laser range finders, tank stabilisation kits and night sights (the latter because they could be useful to terrorists). On the other hand, after ascertaining that the Iranians were unlikely to react adversely it was agreed that no obstacle should be raised to the supply of the mortar locating radar, Cymbeline, or to the Hawk trainer/light ground attack aircraft.

4. Copies are attached of applications that have been received for the supply, or the possible supply, of the following British defence equipment to Iraq:

- a. Prefabricated Surfacing Aluminium for two runways each three kilometres long, worth £3M.

* OPD(74)27

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

- b. 1250 passive driving periscopes worth £7M
1250 infra-red systems and spares for
gun sights and searchlights worth £19M.
- c. 16 sound ranging systems No 2 Mk 1 worth £2.4M.

5. I should be grateful if you would arrange to provide an assessment of the significance (in the context of paragraph 7 of OPD(74)27) of these items and of any further items that may arise in future.

6. Sales 1b, Sales Supply 5 and the Department of Trade (ELB) are requested to ensure that all applications for clearance of equipment to Iraq are copied to DPS(C Team).

For AD Sales 1b Only

7. Plessey Company have stated to ELB that sound ranging systems have previously been supplied to the armed services of Libya and Syria. The Middle East Department of the FCO have asked for details of these supplies, particularly dates. Will you please pass the information, if you have it, direct to Mr Raftery (MED), copy to DS 13.

H. R. BRADEN

24 Sep 74

H R BRADEN
Head of DS 13
Room 0203 Ext 6855
Main Building

Encs:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London, SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

A B Fayle Esq
Ministry of Defence (DS13B)
Main Building
Whitehall
LONDON SW1

Your reference

Our reference NBR 10/1

Date 16 September 1974

Mr Lip,

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ

1 I should be grateful if you would arrange for an assessment to be made of the significance in the context of paragraph 7 of OPD(74)27 of the equipment referred to in the attached copy of a letter from the Department of Trade.

Yours,

PA

P A Raftery
Middle East Department

cc: Ministry of Defence (Sales 1b)
Export Licensing Branch, Dept of Trade

RESTRICTED



Export Licensing Branch
Sanctuary Buildings
16-20 Great Smith Street London SW1P 3DB
Telephone 01-222 7877 ext 4237/8

20

Your reference

Our reference 1A/3576/74

Date

11 SEP 1974


1RA 0

Attached is a copy of particulars of an application to export goods controlled under legislation at present in force.

Is there any objection to the issue of a licence in this case please:

Signed W. KAVANAGH (MISS)

Date 11 SEP 1974



Referred to:-

✓ Foreign & Commonwealth Office
Ministry of Defence (DS8A)
✓ Ministry of Defence (DS13)
Ministry of Defence (DIS)
Ministry of Aviation (Supply)
Department of Trade & Industry

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D120/IE/885-74

0293 28787 251 or 510

1A/ 3576 /74

...OTI .00 T2HITAU E .J.H.H 199

...ATION 10724

SIS OF IBI XH2202 ,YH2472

YH2472 2200

012 70 125

Type 1198A

3404

THE M.E.L. EQUIPMENT CO. LTD.,
MANOR ROYAL, CRAWLEY, SUSSEX RH10 2PZ

0293 28787

251 or 510



...PART ...BAGDAD ...PART 20 ...

1,250 PASSIVE DRIVING PERISCOPES 7,000,000

1,250 INFRA-RED SYSTEMS Gun Sights) 19,000,000

Searchlights)

and spares

After installation

...al .A
...beakodua

...of ...

...no ...

...£24m.

£26,000,000

RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

A B Fayle Esq
Ministry of Defence (DS13b)
Main Building
Whitehall
LONDON SW1

Your reference

Our reference NBR 10/1

Date 16 September 1974

Dear Sir,

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ

1 I should be grateful if you would arrange for an assessment to be made of the significance in the context of paragraph 7 of OPD(74)27 of the airfield landing mat referred to in the attached copy of a letter from Sales Supply.

*Yours,
P A Raftery*

P A Raftery
Middle East Department

cc: Defence Sales 1b, MOD
Sales Supply 5b, MOD

RESTRICTED



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation

St Christopher House Southwark Street London SE1

Telephone 01-928 7999 ext 3631



1. MEJ to ent
2. Mr. Kaptany
I have been told that this will have a great financial value on arms sales to Iraq a general point

Miss M R McIntosh,
FCO Defence Department,
Downing Street,
London, SW1.

Your reference

Our reference

Good. What is the date in memo. 18/7
D/Sales/523/10/12
16 July, 1974.



Dear Miss M^cIntosh,

AIRFIELD LANDING MAT - IRAQ

1. The British Aluminium Company Ltd. (BACO) of Redditch, Worcestershire, have commercial exploitation rights in the above matting, known officially as "extruded aluminium panels for the surfacing of airfields", or PSA (Prefabricated Surfacing Aluminium).

2. The mat is comprised of 3 lb and 4 lb panels. The 3 lb panels were designed by the Military Vehicles and Engineering Establishment, Christchurch, and have been taken into official Service use for the following roles:

- a. Medium Range Transport (MRT) Runways
- b. Forward Operating Pads for VTOL Aircraft
- c. Engine Test Pads

The 3 lb version can accommodate single wheel weights of 30,000 lbs. with tyre pressures 80-100 psi and a California Bearing Rate (CBR) of 6%.

3. There is no specific Service requirement at present for a 4 lb panel. However, as a sales venture with MOD concurrence BACO using basic MVEE(o) design information made a panel to take single wheel weights of 20,000 lbs. with tyre pressures of up to 215 psi and a CBR of 8% which was given simulated tests by MVEE(o). The 4 lb panel can be used to reinforce the 3 lb version which is prone to damage when used on soft ground, thus extending its useful life. It should also be able to take light aircraft and fighters.

4. It is the intention that Fairey Engineering Ltd. (FEL) of Stockport, Cheshire, will act as agents for BACO in the supply to the Iraq MOD of two runways each of three kilometres length made up of two-thirds 3 lb panel and one-third (the centre strip) of 4 lb panel. The mats would therefore appear to be caught under Group 1 of the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1970:

"Appliances for use with arms and apparatus specially designed and intended for land, sea or aerial warfare"

May political and other clearances as might be necessary be given for this proposed sale please which is likely to be in the region of a £3M order.

..... 5. FEL/



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation

St Christopher House Southwark Street London SE1

Telephone 01-928 7999 ext

Miss M R McIntosh,
FCO Defence Department,
Downing Street,
London, SW1

Your reference

Our reference D/Sales/523/10/12

Date

5. FEL have asked for a very early reply if possible please.

*Yours sincerely,
Les Wood.*

Copy to:

Head of DS 13
MOD DS 13b
MOD Defence Policy Staff ✓
DTI (EPB)
Treasury (Defence Materiel Dept)
Sales Supply 5a
Sales 1b

RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AL

1974

Telephone 01-

A B Fayle Esq
Ministry of Defence (DS13b)
Main Building
Whitehall
LONDON SW1

Your reference

Our reference NBR 10/1

Date 19 September 1974

See lip.

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ

1 I should be grateful if you would arrange for an assessment to be made of the significance in the context of paragraph 7 of OPD(74)27 of the equipment referred to in the attached copy of Export Licence Application 1A/3604/74 from the Department of Trade.

2 Would you please also arrange for a check to be made on the statement by Plessey that the equipment in question has been supplied to Libya and Syria; we would be particularly interested to know the date of supply.

Yours,

P A

P A Raftery
Middle East Department

cc: MOD Sales 1b

Export Licensing Branch, Dept of Trade

RESTRICTED



Export Licensing Branch
Sanctuary Buildings
16-20 Great Smith Street London SW1P 3DB

Telephone 01-222 7877 ext

4237/8

21

Your reference

Our reference **TA/3604/74**

Date

IRA 9

Attached is a copy of particulars of an application to export goods controlled under legislation at present in force.

Is there any objection to the issue of a licence in this case please:

Signed W. KAVANAGH (MISS)

Date 11 3 SEP 1974



Referred to:-

- ✓ Foreign & Commonwealth Office
- Ministry of Defence (DS8A)
- ✓ Ministry of Defence (DS13)
- Ministry of Defence (DIS)
- Ministry of Aviation (Supply)
- Department of Trade & Industry

FO

G.6



1A/ 3604 /74

THE PLESSEY COMPANY LIMITED
PLESSEY AVIONICS & COMMUNICATIONS

ILFORD · ESSEX · IG1 4AQ

TELEPHONE 01-478 8040 TELEX 23168 CABLES PLESSEY ILFORD

Our Ref: E/IRQ/5177/4/NGA/ED/AV.COMM.

9th September, 1974.

Department of Trade & Industry,
Export Licensing Branch,
Sanctuary Buildings,
16-20 Great Smith Street,
London, SW1P 3DB.

Dear Sirs,

Iraq

We have received an enquiry from the Government of Iraq requesting our urgent quotation for the supply of Sound Ranging Systems.

This equipment has previously been supplied to the Armed Services of Libya, Syria, Denmark and Singapore for which Export Licences were granted.

Although we have not yet obtained a contract from Iraq, we wish to be able to confirm when quoting, that an Export Licence would be issued.

Yours faithfully,
p.p. THE PLESSEY COMPANY LIMITED.

N. G. Arbon,
Customer Services Manager,
PLESSEY AVIONICS & COMMUNICATIONS.



Encls.



E/IRC/5177/4

01-478-3040

2885

1A/ 3604 /74

Mr. H. G. Arbon,
Plessey Avionics & Communications,
Vicarage Lane,
Ilford,
Essex.



The Plessey Company Ltd., Plessey Avionics & Communications,
Vicarage Lane, Ilford, Essex.
01-478-3040

2885

Basra or Baghdad, Iraq.

Ministry of Defence (Army), Govt. of Iraq,
Baghdad.

16

Sound Ranging Systems No. 2 Lk. 1


£2,400,000.00

7 Microphone Position

ELB Note


URGENT - Please phone your
Clearance

DS 13 (3)

DPS(C)154
DPS(C)304

Copies to:

Naval Plans {with copy of Ref A}
MO 1 {
Air Plans {
DIS (CS) {
MD/HDS {
AUS(Sales) {
Head of DIS (CS) {
D Sales 1 {
D Sales Supply {
AD Sales 1b {
FCO (Def Dept) {
FCO(MED) {
DOT(ELB) {



E.M.A.

L 3 No.

SALE OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT TO IRAQ

Reference: A: D/DS 13/178E dated 24 December 1974.

1. We shall shortly be receiving advice from the DIS on the three particular sales requests covered by Ref A and will advise you accordingly. This minute is concerned with the procedure for dealing with future requests since we clearly want to avoid the FCO having to write for an assessment in every case.

2. We normally assess sales requests, whether to the Arms Working Party or the RMIPC, against two criteria:

a. How does the proposed sale match up to any current Chiefs of Staff (COS) ruling made after taking into account all relevant factors (defence interests, political, security and Service interests)? Such rulings exist at present only for sales to Egypt (1), Iran (2), India and Pakistan (3), Oman (4), Soviet Russia (RB 211) (5), China (6).


b. If there is no COS ruling, are British defence interests affected, ie, will the sale be likely

Notes:

1. COS 29/72, COS 67/72 and DP Note 207/73(Final).
2. DP Note 220/72(Final).
3. COS 4/73.
4. COS 13/74.
5. COS 3/74.
6. COS 18/73.

to threaten (or enhance) any specific interest such as an overseas base, defence installation, overflying or training facilities?

3. The questions of security and of the possible detriment to the supply of the equipment to the Services are both the prerogative of the Service Departments and we do not take them into account, though the Service Department keep us informed as necessary.
4. Apart from the considerations of paras 2 and 3 above, we regard all sales as beneficial to defence interests by definition, since they contribute to the maintenance of the British defence industry.
5. In the case of Iraq, there is no COS ruling therefore 2a does not apply. Defence interests are only remotely affected (overflying Iran could be at risk but this is covered by a Ministers' ruling that Iranian and Kuwaiti susceptibilities should be considered). It is therefore for the FCO to judge the significance of a sale after receiving a short assessment from the DIS, against the criteria of OPD(74)27 alone, of the extent to which acquisition of the equipment would enhance Iraqi military capabilities.
6. We therefore consider that in future cases you, as Secretariat of both the Arms Working Party and the RMIES, should ask the DIS for such an assessment to be circulated to the members of the Arms Working Party or RMIES as appropriate, including the Service Departments in the case of all Sales to Iraq. It would be important for it to be understood that this would be a military assessment on which the FCO can base their political judgement and not an MOD view of whether or not the sale should be authorised.



1 October 1974


G W A NAPIER
Lieutenant Colonel
DPS C Team

To
NED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01- 930-2323 Ext 1268



D A Grossman Esq
Sales 1b
Defence Sales Organisation
Ministry of Defence
Stuart House
Soho Square W1

Your reference

Our reference NBR 10/1

Date 3 October 1974

Dear Mr. Grossman,


IRAQ: COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

1. Thank you for your letter D/Sales/113/48/3 of 23 September 1974.
2. There is no political objection to the supply of Clansman vehicle radios and the mobile scatter communications system to Iraq.
3. I am copying this letter to the other members of the Arms Working Party.

Yours sincerely,

M R McIntosh

M R McINTOSH (MISS)
Defence Department



NR 140/1
Mr Weir

Mr Coles

Mr. Clark 4/10
Mr. R. R. 4/10
Mr. Burton
has seen
4/10

~~Yes~~ (Mr. Wright)

(125)

The Minister of State agrees that on political grounds we should urge the RAB to modify the security restriction on the timing of the supply of this equipment. He considers that it is for RAB Ministers to assess the security factor but his personal view is that the equipment could reasonably be supplied to Iraq 9 months after its delivery to Egypt.

A. J. W. 4/10

CYMBELINE FOR IRAQ

Problem

1. EMI are about to conclude a £4m contract for the supply of the Cymbeline mortar-locating radar to Iraq. The contract states that first delivery will commence 12 months from the date EMI receive an export licence from HMG. The Iraq authorities have asked our Embassy in Baghdad when a licence is likely to be issued and whether there will be any restrictions on the date of first delivery. During his stop-over here this week, the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs asked for a clear indication of when Cymbeline could be delivered.

Background and Argument

2. On 30 July, the Prime Minister agreed to the Secretary of State's recommendation in OPD (74) 27 that the Shah should be sounded out before a decision was taken on the sale of 12 Cymbeline units to Iraq. On 2 August the Ministry of Defence pointed out that agreement to supply Cymbeline to Iraq (and Syria) was conditional upon the date of delivery being acceptable to British Army security requirements. MOD subsequently told us that the date fixed by the Army under the 18 months rule (ie a rule limiting the supply of sensitive equipment for 18 months after it first comes into service with a British Army unit overseas when it may be assumed to be compromised) was late 1976. The rule was however waived for Egypt who took delivery of Cymbeline last month. In my submission of 21 August, I confirmed that the Shah had no objection to the sale and I recommended that HMG's commitment to support the export sales of Cymbeline outweighed the risk of criticism over the possible use of the equipment against the Kurds, adding that in any case Cymbeline would not be delivered before late 1976. The Minister of State agreed on 23 August that the sale of Cymbeline would be entirely in line with OPD (74) 27, especially since the equipment would not come into service in Iraq before 1977, and instructed us to proceed accordingly.

/3.

3. As is the usual practice with firm-to-government sales, it was left to EMI to inform the Iraqis and on 15 August their representative went to Baghdad, but avoided reference to the late 1976 delivery date, apparently because EMI considered that the long delay would cause the Iraqis to lose interest if they were told about it at this stage. MOD Sales have since told us that they were in general agreement with the EMI line, particularly since they proposed to make representations within MOD for the delivery restriction to be modified.

4. The Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs has twice referred to Cymbeline in conversations with our Embassy in Baghdad. He raised it with Mr Weir during the latter's call on 3 October, and said that he wished to telegraph his President in order to let him know of HMG's agreement in principle to supply Cymbeline, and asked for our assistance in reducing delivery delays. Although Mr Weir was careful to avoid any commitment on the latter point, the Minister told me at the Airport this morning that he had told President Bakr that the Foreign Office had "promised" to reduce delivery delays to a minimum, and that the Iraqis would attach great importance to the way in which this "promise" was fulfilled. I made it clear that there might well be difficulties over delivery, but did not mention any specific dates.

5. Although in agreeing to the sale, the Minister of State took into account the late delivery as a supporting factor, OPD (74) 27 did not contain any reservations about delivery. In my view, there need be no objection to delivery earlier than late 1976, providing that MOD Security desiderata (para 2) are met.

6. On the latter point, I would like to support MOD Sales arguments for a modification of the 1976 delivery date. The security argument is weakened by the Egyptian sale; at the very least it would seem more logical to apply the 18 months rule to the date when Cymbeline first went to Egypt (September 1974). The danger of compromise must surely be greater with a foreign country than with our own forces. ~~within 12 months~~ If we assume therefore that the Egyptian Cymbelines will be compromised, the granting of an export licence for Iraq now, thus enabling Iraq to take delivery by October 1975 or earlier, ~~if that can be~~ should meet MOD security requirements.

Recommendation

7. I recommend therefore that it would be in keeping with OPD (74) 27 to make Cymbeline available to Iraq

/before

/within
12 months

before late 1976 and in view of the arguments set out above I hope that the Minister of State can give approval for us to support Defence Sales in their representations to have the security restriction modified along the lines suggested.



P R H Wright
Middle East Department

4 October 1974

cc Defence Department

NENAD

Defence: Anglo/Iraqi Relations and Defence

Equipment

15. Mr Taqa said that he hoped that we could now put all these difficulties behind us and reach a "gentlemen's agreement" to avoid such problems in future. Mr Weir welcomed this and hoped that the Minister would accept that our relations were bound to start gradually after a 2 years' break. Mr Taqa agreed and expressed the view that the Iraqi Government had made a bad mistake in responding to popular emotion at the time by breaking off relations with HMG in 1971. The question over which they had broken [ie the Islands question] had been a matter of great importance to Iraq but they might have been wrong in suggesting that HMG were directly responsible. If they had made a mistake it had certainly cost them a lot. They had in any case decided to resume relations at no cost and had not asked for anything in return from us. He hoped that we could now move ahead together in our mutual interest to meet Iraqi needs, both for development and for defence against aggression. Mr Weir said that we would certainly do everything possible to


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
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

move forward over the whole field of our bilateral relations and said that he had no doubt that Mr Graham would be pursuing all aspects energetically after his arrival in Baghdad. Mr Taqa said that on the question of defence there was one particular question which he wished to raise. The Iraqis had asked some time ago for the supply of a mortar-locating radar system with Cymbeline, but they had heard no reply since then. Mr Weir said that agreement had been given in principle to the supply of Cymbeline although he did not know when it would in fact be available. Mr Taqa said that he was delighted to hear this and would like to telegraph President Bakr immediately to inform him that HMG had agreed to the supply of Cymbeline. Mr Wright emphasised that although HMG had given agreement in principle, delivery might well be delayed although this was of course a matter for discussion between the manufacturers, EMI, and the Iraqi Ministry of Defence. Mr Taqa said that HMG could certainly use their influence to speed up delivery and he hoped that Mr Wright would be able to give him a clear indication of the delivery position before his departure for New York on the following day.



Commercial - in - Confidence



Contract Number.....

for

The Supply of Cymbeline Mortar-locating Radars and ancillary equipment.

This Contract has been made between:

1. The Ministry of Defence of the Government of Iraq, represented by
..... (in this Contract called "the Purchaser")
and
2. EMI Electronics Limited, 135 Blyth Road, Hayes, Middlesex, England,
represented by..... (in this Contract called
"the Supplier").

(125) refers.

Article 1

In accordance with the terms of this Contract, the Supplier will supply to the Purchaser the articles whose quantities, unit prices, and total prices are stated in Appendix 1.

Article 2

In accordance with the terms of this Contract, the Supplier will deliver the articles stated in Appendix 1 on or before the dates stated in Appendix 2, except as provided in Article 3 or Article 4. Delivery will be made by the Supplier to the order of the Purchaser FOB English seaport or London Airport, at which point property in the articles will pass from the Supplier to the Purchaser.

Article 3

In the event that circumstances outside the control of the Supplier cause delay in any delivery stated in Appendix 2, the Supplier will inform the Purchaser of the reasons for such delay and will report progress on the scheduled delivery to the Purchaser at intervals of one calendar month. The Supplier will grant extensions of the delivery time as necessary up to six months from the delivery date originally stated in Appendix 2 for the delayed article or articles. In the event that delay due to circumstances outside the control of the Supplier has exceeded six months for any

Article 17

All articles to be supplied under this Contract will be packed by the Supplier suitably for sea transport or air transport as the case may be. Four weeks before each due delivery date as stated in Appendix 2 the Purchaser or the Purchaser's appointed organisation as stated in Article 5 will instruct the Supplier whether the articles to be delivered are to be packed for sea transport or air transport. Any delay caused by a change in instructions already given will be a delay due to circumstances outside the control of the Supplier as stated in Article 3.

Article 18

Disputes arising in the performance of this Contract which cannot be solved amicably will be referred to an Arbitration Committee consisting of a representative appointed by the Purchaser and a representative appointed by the Supplier and a Chairman. The representatives of the Purchaser and the Supplier will meet and appoint the Chairman. If the two representatives fail to agree on the Chairman he will be appointed by the President of the International Chamber of Commerce at Berne. The Committee will meet in Berne and will be bound by the Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris. The findings of this Committee will be final and binding on both parties and will include an adjudication on how the costs of the arbitration proceedings are to be borne.

Article 19

The Effective Date will be defined as follows:

- (a) If the UK Government issues an export licence to the Supplier before 1st January 1975 covering all articles in Appendix 1 with no restriction on the date of first delivery, the Effective Date will be the date on which the Supplier receives the export licence. In this case the prices stated in Appendix 1 are firm and not subject to revision.

(b) If the UK Government issues an export licence after 31st December 1974 or if the UK Government before 1st January 1975 issues an export licence with a restriction on the date of first delivery, the Purchaser and the Supplier will consult together regarding revision of the prices and other details of Appendix 1 and Appendix 2. If the Purchaser and the Supplier reach agreement on such revision, the date of such agreement will be the Effective Date. If the Purchaser and the Supplier fail to reach agreement on such revision within two months after the date of issue of the export licence, this Contract will be null and void.

Article 20

If within 24 months after the Effective Date the Purchaser and the Supplier make a further contract for the supply of not less than twelve radars the Supplier will make a reduction of 2½% on the prices of Items 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Appendix 1 of this Contract.

This reduction will be given either as a pro-rata deduction from invoices for articles remaining to be shipped on this Contract or by a deduction from the initial payment on the further contract or by such other method as the Purchaser and the Supplier may agree between them.

Signed for
EMJ Electronics Ltd

.....

Date.....

Witness.....

Signed for the Ministry of
Defence of the
Government of Iraq

.....

Date.....

Witness.....

APPENDIX 1

<u>Item</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Qty</u>	<u>Unit price £</u>	<u>Total price £</u>
1	Cymbeline radars	12	132 000	1 584 000
2	Sets of Spare Units	12	57 000	684 000
3	Mobile repair vehicle bodies	4	200,000 220,000	800,000 880,000
4a	Set of Field Service T/E from base workshop test equipment	1	20 000)	110 000
4b	Remainder of Base Workshop Test Equipment	1	90 000)	
5	Selection of maintenance spares for Items 1 to 4			487 000
				<u>3,745,000</u> <u>3,665,000</u>

These prices are subject to the provisions of Article 20

These prices are packed FOB English seaport or London Airport

They include all taxes and imposts levied by the UK Government

They exclude all taxes and imposts levied by the Iraqi Government

The above prices include the supply of documentation in English as follows:-

30 copies Operational Manual (British Army issue)

10 copies Maintenance Regulations (British Army issue)

10 copies Illustrated Spare Parts List (British Army issue)

During the delivery period as stated in Appendix 2, or by the date of the final delivery, whichever is earlier, the Purchaser may increase his requirements of the above quantities by up to 20% and the Supplier will supply such increased quantities at the prices stated above except for Item 3. Delivery periods for such increased quantities shall be by agreement.

APPENDIX 2

<u>Item</u>	<u>Delivery</u>
1	1 twelve months from the Effective Date, and 1 per month thereafter
2	1 set twelve months from the Effective Date, and 1 set per month thereafter
3	1 fifteen months from the Effective Date, 1 eighteen months from the Effective Date, 2 twentyone months from the Effective Date
4a	twelve months from the Effective Date
4b	fifteen months from the Effective Date
5	begin fifteen months and complete twentyone months from the Effective Date

The Supplier will endeavour, without commitment, to advance the delivery of up to two of Item 1, up to four of Item 2, and the whole of Item 4a by ~~six~~ months from the dates given above.

nine.
nine

Mr Clark

Mr. Raftery
 I agree that we sh'd wait a bit for the
 MOD to answer but think we should not
 act precipitately on your manuscript
 amendment to para. 8. *Yf 1.0*

1. Reference Baghdad telegram No 342 (121).

2. At my request, Brittain of Defence Sales 1(b) called on Brooks of EMI on 27 September to discuss the problems connected with the sale of Cymbeline to Iraq. Subsequently, Brittain told me that when Brooks went to Baghdad on 15 September he signed the contract which he had presented to the Iraqis in July and the position now is that he is awaiting their decision to sign. According to Brooks, the delivery of Cymbeline was not discussed by him with the Iraqis and no commitment of any kind on delivery has been made. Brooks also confirmed that he had heeded Brittain's advice to avoid involving the Embassy in the negotiations and in defence to this he had arranged with the Iraqis that any communications with EMI would be channelled through the Iraqi Military Attaché in London rather than through our Embassy, in Baghdad.

3. Apparently Brittain has had a copy of the EMI contract since July and he was aware of Article 19, which not only contains the reference to an export licence mentioned in paragraph 2 of Baghdad's tel No 342 but also contains a reservation about the imposition of delivery restrictions by HMG. Brittain had had it in mind to send us a copy of the contract but had not got around to doing so. (Since the receipt of Baghdad tel No 342, I have made two requests for a copy at least of Article 19 and I have been promised that this will be sent).

4. In Brittain's view, Brooks' position is in accord with advice which Brittain had given him not give delivery dates to the Iraqis. Brittain's reasons were that a 1976 delivery date would probably cause the Iraqis to give up the idea of purchasing Cymbeline altogether and this would lose EMI a very valuable order. Although the present MOD restriction on delivery before late 1976 was firm, he did not consider it immutable, particularly with a General Election in the offing and he thought it sensible for EMI to keep the Iraqis on the hook. His intention was to work for a relaxation of the MOD restrictions so as to improve the delivery date for Iraq; the decision by FCO Ministers to link their agreement on sale to the present delivery dates had rather upset his plans but he remains of the view that EMI should not commit themselves with the Iraqis on the deal. Brittain said he was not aware of the supply of Cymbeline to Egypt.

/5....

5. I have since spoken to Brigadier Sherman, GS(OR)I, who imposed restriction on delivery to Iraq. He explained that the rule is not to allow delivery of sensitive equipment to countries where there was a high risk of detailed examination by "hostiles" (i.e. Russians, ~~at Al and the rest~~) until the equipment had been in service with British Units overseas for 18 months. In the case of the Egyptians, this rule had been waived on several grounds, the principle one so far as he was concerned being the Egyptian agreement to protect the equipment from hostile examination. I gathered that this Egyptian undertaking had been ~~accepted~~ ^{accepted} ~~expired~~ with a certain amount of scepticism, but this was seen as no reason to extend a similar relaxation of the rule to Iraq. Brigadier Sherman added that this had all been gone into at a meeting on 18 September of the Cymbeline Sales Working Group, which is chaired by Mr Levinson of MOD DS 13(c). Mr Corrés of EMI, who attended the meeting, registered a protest against the MOD decision and made it clear that EMI were prepared to fight it at the highest level. Brigadier Sherman said that Corrés was speaking at the meeting in terms of delivery to the Iraqis in February 1975 and he also declared that EMI would sign a contract with the Iraqis regardless of the MOD restriction.

6. I subsequently spoke to Mr Levinson, who could not recollect these comments by EMI at the meeting. As he had not seen Baghdad tel No 342 and as Mr Brittain had not spoken to him, he was not able to give a view, though he ~~accepted~~ that on the face of it MOD's advice to EMI appeared to be out of line with what had been agreed by them with the FCO. However, he agreed to consider the matter quickly with his colleagues.

7. I have also put down a marker with Mr Braden's secretary to draw his attention to the problem. I did speak to him briefly last week before Brittain called on Brooks; he said then that he would probably tell Brittain that Brooks should advise the Iraqis that, after examining the production schedules, the delivery date for Iraq would be late 1976; he thought that by this advice the matter would be resolved. In the event, Brittain did not say anything of the kind to Brooks.

8. This is all rather inconclusive and does not provide the substance for a reply to Baghdad tel No 342. I suggest that we give MOD a little longer to sort their lines out before taking any action, though in the end any feeling is that the best course would be to tell Mr. Giddens to inform the Iraqis of the delivery date and have done with it.

1 October 1974

P. A. Raftery
P A Raftery
Middle East Department



checked with Westlake
 with the absence of pages 2-7
 and they confirmed that
 this copy is an answer to them

With the Compliments of EMI! ; presumably

Sales 1(b)

2.10.74

The other pages contain
 various handwritten
 notes of no

Ministry of Defence

Defence Sales Organisation

Stuart House 23-25 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ

Telex 23605

Telephone 01 ~~457 3200 ext~~

London

River M.A.

632-4708

to them

4th.

U/ME

CONFIDENTIAL

LH 384D

FROM : P D BRITTAIN, Assistant Director



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation

Sales 1b

Stuart House 23 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ

Telex 23605

Direct line 01-632 4707

Switchboard 01-632 3333

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
7 OCT 1974
NBR 10/1

Your reference

P A Raftery Esq

Middle East Department

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

LONDON SW1

Our reference

D/Sales/113/18/1

Date

October 1974

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
- 3 OCT 1974

Don Peter

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ

I see from paragraph 7 of Hugh Braden's minute of 24 September, reference D/DS13/178E, that you need information on Plessey Sales of Sound Ranging Equipment to Iraq. This follows from your letter NBR 10/1 to DS13b of 19 September.

The Export Licensing Branch of the Department of Trade tell us that Plessey were given export licences for Libya and Syria, as follows:

LIBYA

Unknown quantity of systems (possibly 8), value £1M, August 1971. Various spares, value £17K, April 1974.

SYRIA

2 systems, value £267K, February 1974. Various spares, value £27K, March 1974.

Plessey have confirmed that the systems were delivered.

Yours


GW
Peter Braden

Copy to Sales 1(a)

CONFIDENTIAL

FG

VZCZC DFA020



(129)
0132

DSAO-T-BDA BAGHDAD

-T-FCO (MED)

DE RBDWC 0476 2761650

ROUTINE 031310Z OCT

FM MODUK

TO BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD

INFO FCO (MED)

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

DIG EBR/LPE

FROM SALES 1B PD MILITARY ENGINEER STORES PD RE YOUR 110500Z

SEP PD ONE PD MINE EXPLoder PD EQUIPMENT OBSOLETE AND NO LONGER

OBTAINABLE PD TWO PD MINE LAYER PD BAR MINE LAYER MEETS REQUIREMENT

BUT REGRET TOO CONTROVERSIAL FOR SUPPLY TO IRAQ PD SUGGEST YOU SAY

UNSUITABLE FOR IRAQ AS LOCAL HIGH AMBIENT TEMPERATURES AND NEED OFR


HUMIDITY CONTROL PRESENT PROBLEMS IN TERRITORY SUCH AS IRAQ IN REGARD

TO BARMINES PD YOU MAY WISH TO ADD THAT TROPICAL BAR MINE IS UNDER

LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT

BT


C WA NEED FOR



MED

NNNN

(Bo)

Mr ~~Clark~~Mr ~~Wright~~

CYMBELINE FOR IRAQ

1. I have now learned from MOD/DS 13 that the decision to sell Cymbeline to Egypt was taken in March 1973 by the Minister of State in the MOD as a result of representations by the Head of Defence Sales. Sir Lester Suffield reported that the Egyptian purchasing mission who were ~~in London~~ at the time had stated that a delivery date later than January 1974 was unacceptable to them and that the order would be lost unless this was agreed. He pointed out that EMI had put up 50% of the equity for the research and development into Cymbeline, that the security rating of the equipment was only restricted, and anyway that it had already been sold to South Africa.

2. I have also had confirmation from Defence Sales that the normal delivery time for Cymbeline is about 12 months from date of signature of the contract.

4 October 1974

I. dalt

P A Raftery
Middle East Department

for spec. A meeting telegram sent to R.
B. J. J.
already done by Mr Barker
I.A. L. H. 2/2

(131)

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
8 OCT 1974
NBR 10/1

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY
GPS 90
CYPHER CAT A

FM FCO 041745Z OCT
CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD TEL NO 249 OF 4 OCTOBER 1974

(121) YOUR TEL 342: CYMBELINE

1. WEIR AND WRIGHT CALLED ON TAQA ON 3 OCTOBER. IN
PARAGRAPH 15 OF THE DRAFT RECORD, WHICH FOLLOWS BY BAG, WRIGHT
REPORTS DISCUSSION OF THE CYMBELINE CONTRACT.

(117) THIS SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE READ AS INDICATING ANY
CHANGE IN OUR POSITION AS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY
TEL 235. YOU SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT THEREFORE DISCUSS
CYMBELINE WITH THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES UNTIL A SUBSTANTIVE
REPLY IS SENT TO YOUR TUR.

CALLAGHAN

FILES
MED
MR WEIR

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

1A (132)

I S MacDonald Esq
Head of Defence Sales 1
Ministry of Defence
Stuart House
Soho Square, W1

Your reference 7/61 1008 -
Our reference NBR 10/1
Date 7 October 1974

Dear Ian.

CYMBELINE FOR IRAQ

(104)


1. In my letter to Hugh Braden of 28 August, I said that our Ministers had confirmed that the sale of Cymbeline to Iraq could proceed, bearing in mind our understanding that the equipment would not be delivered before late 1976.
2. I understand that you have reservations about this extended delivery restriction, which was imposed within MOD under a general security procedure known as the "18 months' rule", and that you propose to submit this for reconsideration in the hope that the period of delay may be foreshortened without significantly impairing security desiderata.
3. When the Iraq Minister of Foreign Affairs was in London last week, he specifically raised with us the sale of Cymbeline. Mr Taqa was told that HMG had agreed in principle to the sale of Cymbeline (this had already been implied to him by our Embassy in Baghdad early in September) and he went on to ask for our assistance in pressing the manufacturers to reduce delivery delays. Although our response was carefully guarded to avoid any commitment, Mr Taqa chose to interpret it as a "promise" to reduce delivery delays to a minimum and, in his departure from London, told me that he had already telegraphed President Bakr to this effect: he added that the Iraqis would attach great importance to the way in which this "promise" was fulfilled.
4. As you know, we have hitherto tried to avoid any direct discussion with the Iraqis about the sale of Cymbeline, preferring to leave it to EMI to make the running in the usual way, although Mr Taqa has twice referred to the topic in conversations with our Embassy in Baghdad. However, the Iraqis have now made it very clear that much will depend on our readiness to assist over delivery. They have of course no idea /that



that delivery could be delayed as long as two years and we can expect strong repercussions if we cannot improve on this; indeed, the only indication which the Iraqis will have received of delivery dates comes from the reference in EMI's contract to delivery of the first units one year after the "effective date" of the contract. The problem is aggravated by the fact that Egypt took delivery of Cymbeline equipment last month, which will make the term of the present restriction on the Iraqis even more difficult to explain.

5. We have consulted our Ministers who are of the view that, while it is for MOD Ministers to assess the security factor, the pressure from the Iraq Foreign Minister, combined with the fact that the equipment is already available to Egypt, provides strong political grounds for urging that the restriction on delivery should be re-considered with the aim of reducing the delay for Iraq to the minimum. In practice, and bearing the Kurdish situation in mind, our Ministers have commented that, on political grounds, they would see no reason why the equipment should not reasonably be supplied to Iraq nine months after the delivery to Egypt.

6. As I expect that the Iraqis will press for an answer very soon (President Bakr may conceivably put the question to our Ambassador in Baghdad when he presents his credentials shortly) I should be grateful if this could be considered as a matter of urgency.

Sincerely,

P R H Wright
Middle East Department

cc H R Braden Esq
Head of DS 13
MOD

Defence Dept

Security Classification ----- 15 spaces ----->

RESTRICTED

Message Instructions ----- 15 spaces ----->

(133)

AMRAD
SIGNAL
MESSAGE
FORM

Precedences

ACT INFO

DTG

FROM


*TO

ROUTINE

041015

MODUK

BRITISH EMBASSY BAGHDAD



*USE A
SEPARATE
LINE
FOR
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ADDRESSEE

*INFO

- 3 -
spaces

Line Feed

TEXT Security Classification

RESTRICTED

Special Handling Caveat Only

DIG(s) Only

DIG OGU

FOR BRITISH ATTACHE FROM MDS3 GRIFFIN .

- FAIREY ENGINEERING HAVE INVITED THREE IRAQI ENGINEER OFFICERS TO VISIT THEM OVER MEDIUM GIRDER BRIDGE. FAIREY HAVE ASKED US TO ARRANGE FOR THESE OFFICERS TO VISIT MVEE CHRISTCHURCH AND RSME CHATHAM FOR DISCUSSION ON AND VIEW DEMONSTRATION OF MGB. FAIREY EXPECT THE VISIT SOMETIME IN OCT 74 AND ANTICIPATE THERE WILL ONLY BE APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEKS NOTICE OF INTENDED ARRIVAL.
- GRATEFUL YOU LET US KNOW WHETHER YOU WISH MOD TO BE INVOLVED AND WHETHER YOU KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THIS. IF SO, GRATEFUL INFORMATION SOONEST.

Special Distribution
See note 9

File Reference

DRAFTER'S NAME
(Block letters)

Extension

Branch

RELEASING OFFICER'S
Signature

Page...1...
of
...2... Pages

Have you referred to a
classified message ?
(Answer YES or NO in box)

NO

Grade/
RankName
(Block letters)

Security

PRECEDENCE Action / Info	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	DATE--TIME--GROUP	MOD FORM 140A (continuation sheet)
ROUTINE	RESTRICTED	041015	

IN GENERAL WE ARE VERY RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT SUCH VISITS AT ONE WEEKS NOTICE. MOD ESTABLISHMENTS MUST (MUST) BE GIVEN ADEQUATE NOTICE BEFORE ARRIVAL OF VISITORS AND THE NORMAL TIME FRAME FOR VISITS SHOULD BE ABOUT 6 WEEKS FROM INITIATION AND 3 WEEKS FROM THE DATE WE IN MOD ACCEPT THE DATE OF ARRIVAL. HAVING SAID THAT IN THE HOPES YOU CAN STEER THIS ACCORDINGLY, WE CAN SAY WE HAVE TAKEN SOME SOUNDINGS AND IF THE IRAQIS DID COME IN OCT THEY COULD BE ACCEPTED BY RSME ON TUESDAY 22 OCT FOR MGB DEMONSTRATION. IF HOWEVER THIS DATE DOES NOT COINCIDE WITH THEIR VISIT TO UK THEN WE MUST RE-NEGOTIATE WITH ESTABLISHMENTS CONCERNED AND WE WOULD STICK OUT FOR ADEQUATE NOTICE. IN THIS EVENT WOULD BEST TRY TO STEER THE VISIT TO LATE OCTOBER OR TO NOVEMBER.

Copy to: RSME, CHATHAM
MVEE, CHRISTCHURCH
MVEE, CHOBHAM
MDS 1b
FCO ME Department ✓

Special Distribution
See note 9

File Reference MDS3/20/53/5

DRAFTER'S NAME
(Block letters) P.S.D. GRIFFIN

Extension 3105MB Branch MDS3

RELEASING OFFICER'S
Signature *P.S.D. Griffin*

Page.....2.....
of
2.....Pages

Have you referred to a
classified message?
(Answer YES or NO in box)

NO

Grade/
Rank Lt.Colonel Name
(Block letters) P.S.D. GRIFFIN

RR MODUK ARMY

RR FCO

GRS 80

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 080730Z OCT.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TO ROUTINE MODUK TEL OF 8 OCTOBER 1974, INFO ROUTINE FCO.

DIG EBR.

FOR MOD SALES 1 B.

FROM DA.

SIMFIRE.

1. GEN. KASHMULA DCGS OPERATIONAL EQPT HAS INFORMED ME THAT A FURTHER APPROACH AND DEMO BY SOLATRON IN IRAQ OR UK WOULD BE WELCOME.
2. THEY REMEMBER THE LAST DEMO IN BAGHDAD IN 1971 AND ONLY REMEMBER WHAT WENT WRONG.
3. IN VIEW OF THE PRESENT RAPID EXPANSION OF THE IRAQI ARMY A SUCCESSFUL AND POSITIVE APPROACH BY SOLATRON COULD RESULT IN SUBSTANTIAL SALES.

GRAHAM

BT

M. Wigner.

This is an artillery simulated live fir. Agreement to sell it to Iraq is covered by OAS (74) 27.

I. Hall 8/6

NNNN

ADVANCE COPY

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35. - 9-OCT 1974 NB1210/1

Def. D/2
MES

(2)

[filing]

M. RATTAY

ETA (also)

GRS 110/2

CONFIDENTIAL

(135)

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 090530Z OCT

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO 35 10 OCT 1974 NSR 10/1

TOP COPY

~~ETA~~ (9/1)

74

TO ROUTINE MODUK TELNO 090530Z OCTOBER/INFO ROUTINE FCO.
DIG EBR.

FROM DA FOR MOD SALES 16.

LYNX GAZELLE HELICOPTERS.

1. COL KHATAN DIRECTOR OF SUPPLY IAF HAS SAID IAF ARE VERY INTERESTED IN THESE A/C AND HE REQUESTED AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION REPORT OF THEIR PERFORMANCE. ETC, ETC, ETC.
2. HE WOULD NOT CONFIRM WHETHER APPROACHES HAD ALREADY BEEN

MADE TO WESTLANDS BUT SAID HE DID NOT TRUST MANUFACTURERS' 4 REPORTS.

3. IS THERE ANY HOPE OF (A) HMG AGREEMENT TO SELLING COESE AIRCRAFT TO IRAQ AND (B) IF SO, THEN ALLOWING IRAQ TO HAVE SIGHT OF OUR SERVICE EVALUATION.

GRAHAM

BT

FILES
MED
DEFENCE DEPT
MR THOMSON
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR

[SENT TO DCC]

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

GRS 145

ADVANCE CO

RECEIVED IN REGISTR. N 5136
11 OCT 1974
NBR 10/1
(2)

Def. D. (2)
MET

[files]

Interim

Mr. R. T. T. T.

YPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 101000Z OCT.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TO ROUTINE MODUK TEL OF 10 OCTOBER 1974, INFO
ROUTINE FCO (FOR DEF AND ME DEPTS).

DIG EBR/OGU.
FROM DA.

CYMBELINE FOR IRAQ.

1. THE FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM IRAQ MOD :

"SUBJECT CONTRACT 73 ARMAMENTS AND SUPPLIES 91 RADAR
CYMBELINE. ABOVE CONTRACT HAS BEEN SIGNED WITH EMI TO
FURNISH US WITH CYMBELINE RADAR. CONTRACT PROVIDES
THAT WE SHALL PAY THE COMPANY AN ADVANCE, PAYMENT OF
30% OF TOTAL VALUE OF CONTRACT AGAINST A LETTER OF
GUARANTEE TO BE SUBMITTED BY THE COMPANY WITHIN 2
WEEKS FROM DATE OF EXPORT CERTIFICATE ISSUED BY THE
BRITISH GOVT. YOU ARE KINDLY REQUESTED TO MEDIATE
WITH YOUR GOVT. TO GRANT THE COMPANY THE SAID
CERTIFICATE FOR THE PURPOSE OF IMPLEMENTING THIS CONTRACT."

2. THIS IS PART OF A MOUNTING CAMPAIGN TO GET A
DEFINITIVE ANSWER ON WHEN HMG WILL APPROVE EXPORT
LICENCE FOR AN EQPT IRAQIS NEED URGENTLY AND WHICH
WE HAVE TOLD THEM WE AGREE TO SUPPLY.

3. SUBSTANTIVE REPLY REFERRED TO IN FCO TEL NO 249
OF 4 OCT NOT YET RECEIVED.

4. GRATEFUL YOUR ADVICE.

GRAHAM
BT

(137)



FO 965/10

E 102/10

LKS NR 977/10

RR FCO

GRS 50

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 101006Z OCT.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 365 OF 10 OCTOBER 1974.

YOUR TEL NO 249 : ARMS SALES.

1. IRAQIS HAVE NOW SIGNED A CONTRACT FOR CYMBELINE (SEE DEFENCE ATTACHE'S TEL NO EBR/OGU 101000Z TO MODUK). THIS DEVELOPMENT GREATLY STRENGTHENS THE ARGUMENT IN GIDDENS'S TEL NO 342. ANY DELAY IS LIKELY TO BE LAID AT HMG'S DOOR.

GRAHAM

BT

NNNN

ADVANCE COPY

Head MED

(File)

M. Raftery

(131)

DS 13 (2)

DPS(C)154

(138)

Copies to:

Naval Plans

MC 1

Air Plans

DIS(CS)

MD/HDS

D Sales 1


D Sales Supply

AD Sales 1b

FCO (Defence Department)

FCO (Middle East Department) ✓

Department of Trade (ELB)



I have confirmed with Gr. Napier
that this assessment applies equally
to Iraq/Iran and Iraq/Kuwait.

I. Haller 10/10

SALE OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT TO IRAQ

References: A. D/DS 13/178E dated 24 September 1974.

B. DPS(C)154 dated 1 October 1974.

1. We have now received DIS advice on the three items covered by Ref A. In our view, although the acquisition of these equipments will marginally enhance Iraqi military capability, in no case would this enhancement be significant.

2. a. Prefabricated surface (Aluminium) for runways: the type of aircraft for which this equipment is suitable makes its acquisition unlikely to affect the balance of power.

OK W
Iran/Kuwait

b. Passive driver periscopes IR system etc: both Arab and Israeli forces already possess a degree of night fighting capability. Although this projected sale will undoubtedly increase Iraqi capability, we assess that it will not necessarily have a significant effect.

c. Sound ranging systems: these systems will increase the efficiency of Iraqi artillery. The Syrians and Libyans already possess sound ranging systems and a further supply (to Iraq) is unlikely to affect the overall balance in the Israeli's context.

OK W
Iran/Kuwait

3. Provided that Service Department interests are taken into account, we therefore have no objection to the proposed sale.

M B Pritchard

M B PRITCHARD
Colonel
AD of DP(C)

9 October 1974

7343

TO
MED

LH 384E



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation Sales 1b

Stuart House 23 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ

Telex 23805

Telephone 01 427 9288 ext.

Direct Line 01 632 4708

Switchboard 01 632 3333

Mr. Lane.

Buter MED.

(139)

Miss M R McIntosh
Defence Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
London SW1

Your reference

Our reference

D/Sales/113/18/1

Date D/Sales/113/112/3

7 October 1974

Dear Miss McIntosh

ARMS WORKING PARTY CLEARANCES

Could we have an indication of your Department's view to the sale of the equipment described below please?

- 1 Country. Iraq
- 2 Description of Equipment. Medium Girder Bridge with floating capability.
- 3 Security classification of equipment. Unclassified
- 4 Value of sale. £5-6M
- 5 Further information. The equipment manufacturer is Fairey Engineering Ltd.

Please note that a team of senior Iraqi Officers will be visiting the UK this month to view the equipment, and I shall be grateful, therefore, for an early reply.

I am copying this letter to the other members of the A.W.P.

Yours sincerely

D A Grossman

Copies to:-

Mr H R Braden - DS13
Mr M Esau - DS13b
Mr W P Cassell - Treasury
Mr P T Durnell - DOT (EPB)
Lt Col C W A Napier - DPS (C team)

Mr Raftery MED.

Any objections pre?

White Lane '07
Defence Dept 1/10

This has to await the Service assessment of the equipment in terms of OPD 27 (74).

E-1A. 1/10

was included in comparison

of equipment submitted for clearance. Rm Co.





Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
- 8 OCT 1974

(143)

P D Britten Esq
MOD Sales - 1B
Stuart House (SS306)
23/25 Soho Square
London W 1

Your reference

Our reference NBR 10/1

Date 8 October 1974

Dear Sir,

Mr. L. No.

CYMBELINE FOR IRAQ

1. Patrick Wright's letter NBR 10/1 of 7 October refers.
2. As I said over the telephone, we are concerned that the Iraqis may approach EMI direct as a consequence of the message sent by their Foreign Minister to President Bakr last week. If this should happen and EMI should say that delivery delays are being imposed by us, there could be strong repercussions. You agreed, therefore, to advise EMI at the earliest opportunity that in response to any Iraqi inquiries at this stage they should in no way imply that HMG are imposing any delivery restrictions on Cymbeline.

Yours,

P A
P A Raftery
Middle East Department

CONFIDENTIAL

FO 579/E109/8

LKS NR 936/8

RR MODUK

GRS 75

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 080720Z OCT.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TO ROUTINE MODUK TEL OF 8 OCTOBER 1974.

DIG EBR.

FOR DEF SALES 1B.

FROM DA.

PURCHASE OF CENTURION SPARES FROM IRAQ.


1. LETTER SUPPOSEDLY COPIED TO YOU RECEIVED FROM AVIATION JERSEY LTD. REQUESTING ASSISTANCE AND INFORMATION ON PURCHASING CENTURION SPARES FROM IRAQ ARMY?

2. BEFORE ANY FURTHER ACTION PLEASE CONFIRM.

- A) YOU HAVE COPY OF LETTER DATED 30 SEP 74
- B) THEY ARE REPUTABLE FIRM
- C) NO OBJECTIONS TO ACTION ON THEIR REQUEST.

GRAHAM

BT



MOD DISTRIBUTION

MED

Mr. Raftery

I have confirmed that we have no objection to this.

ETA 14/10

10
MED

(12)

GRS 80

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 080730Z OCT.

NBR 10/1

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TO ROUTINE MODUK TEL OF 8 OCTOBER 1974, INFO ROUTINE FCO.

DIG EBR.

FOR MOD SALES 1 B.

FROM DA.

SIMFIRE.

1. GEN. KASMMULA DCGS OPERATIONAL EQPT HAS INFORMED ME THAT A FURTHER APPROACH AND DEMO BY SOLATRON IN IRAQ OR UK WOULD BE WELCOME.

2. THEY REMEMBER THE LAST DEMO IN BAGHDAD IN 1971 AND ONLY REMEMBER WHAT WENT WRONG.

3. IN VIEW OF THE PRESENT RAPID EXPANSION OF THE IRAQI ARMY A SUCCESSFUL AND POSITIVE APPROACH BY SOLATRON COULD RESULT IN SUBSTANTIAL SALES.

GRAHAM

/SENT TO DCC/

FILES

DEFENCE DEPT
MED

MR THOMSON
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR

CONFIDENTIAL

E 24/9

LKS 045/9

RR MODUK

RR FCO

CRS 110/2

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 090530Z OCT

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE MODUK TELNO 090530Z OCTOBER INFO ROUTINE FCO.
DIG EBR.

FROM DA FOR MOD SALES 16.

LYNX CAZELLE HELICOPTERS.

1. COL KHATAN DIRECTOR OF SUPPLY IAF HAS SAID IAF ARE VERY INTERESTED IN THESE A/C AND HE REQUESTED AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION REPORT OF THEIR PERFORMANCE. ETC, ETC, ETC.
2. HE WOULD NOT CONFIRM WHETHER APPROACHES HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE TO WESTLANDS BUT SAID HE DID NOT TRUST MANUFACTURERS' 4 REPORTS.
3. IS THERE ANY HOPE OF (A) HMG AGREEMENT TO SELLING CGESE AIRCRAFT TO IRAQ AND (B) IF SO, THEN ALLOWING IRAQ TO HAVE SIGHT OF OUR SERVICE EVALUATION.

GRAHAM

BT

ADVANCE COPY

Mr. Wright.

I discussed this with Mr. [unclear] SS 13 about six weeks ago: they did not think it was a matter and they subsequently advised Westlands not to pursue the matter with the Iraqis.

I. Hall 9/10

Mr. Raftery

What does he think?

RECEIVED IN
REGISTER No 35
15 OCT 1974

NBR 16/1

[File]

FM BAGHDAD 100730Z OCT

CONFIDENTIAL

TO R PRIORITY MODUK TELNO 100730Z OCT INFO ROUTINE
FCO.

DIG CGU/EBR

FROM DA FOR GRIFFIN MDS 3 AND SALES 16.

ENGINEER EQPT FOR IRAQ ARMY.

YOUR 041015Z OCT IS REF A (NOT TO FCO).

MY EBR 221010Z JULY TO MOD SALES 1B IS REF B.

MOD SALES 1B 060930Z AUG IS REF C.

1. APPROACHES MADE TO ME BY IRAQ MOD TO CHARGE D'AFFAIRES BY
MFA, AND TO FAIREYS BY IRAQ EMBASSY IN LONDON ON EMERGENCY
BRIDGING EQUIPMENT IN JULY FOLLOWED BY LIST OF OTHER ENGINEER
EQPT SENT TO SALES 1B IN REF B.

2. REF C CONTAINS PART OF ANSWER. FOLLOWED BY LATER SIGNALS.
ANSWERS STILL AWAITED ON FV 180 COMBAT ENGR TRACTOR AND
POWER RAFT CLASS 16.

3. WOULD BE DELIGHTED IF YOU GOT INVOLVED. WOULD SHOW
IRAQIS IN A SOMEWHAT NEGATIVE YEAR FOR US THAT WE ARE AT
LEAST INTERESTED IN SELLING THEM SOMETHING IN THE DEFENCE FIELD.


4. ATTEMPTS THIS MORNING WITH DCGS TO PUT OFF PROPOSED VISIT
OF 3 OFFICERS TILL END OF NOVEMBER PARTIALLY FAILED ALTHOUGH
NO FIRM ANSWER ON ETD WILL BE GIVEN BEFORE 12 OCTOBER.

5. DCGS TOLD ME THEY URGENTLY REQUIRE ALL TYPES OF ENGINEER
EQUIPMENT. ATTEMPTS TO ELICIT SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS OTHER
THAN THOSE LISTED IN REF B NOT SUCCESSFUL. REPLY WAS SHOW
US ALL YOU CAN SELL US.

6. UNDOUBTEDLY THERE ARE PROSPECTS OF GOOD SALES IF PRICE
AND DELIVERY IS RIGHT. NO SHORTAGE OF MONEY.

7. WOULD SUGGEST FOLLOWING EQPT SHOULD BE SHOWN :

BRIDGES, ARMoured VEHICLE LAUNCHED HEAVY DUTY, PORTABLE MODULAR.



7. WOULD SUGGEST FOLLOWING EQPT SHOULD BE SHOWN :
BRIDGES, ARMoured VEHICLE LAUNCHED HEAVY DUTY, PORTABLE MODULAR,
BAILEY, TRENCH DIGGING AND CRATERING EXPLOSIVE KITS, PORTABLE
ROADWAYS, AND ARMoured PLANT, AS WELL AS CONTENTS OF REF B WE
ARE ALLOWED TO SELL THEM.

GRAHAM

~~BT~~

C. D. T. J.

(145)

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A
ROUTINE 100730Z OCT 1974
FM MODUK
TO BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD
INFO FCO MED

TOP COPY

RECEIVED IN 2
REGISTER N 35
14 OCT 1974
NBR 10/1

+ PA R11/6.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

DIG EBR/LPE

FROM SALES 1B. SIMFIRE. RE YOUR 080730Z OCT.

SOLARTRON EXPRESS THANKS FOR TIP. FIRM WILL MAKE FURTHER
ENQUIRES AND ADVISE YOU OF OUTCOME

FILES

MED
DEFENCE DEPT
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR
MR THOMSON

CONFIDENTIAL

TO MED

CONFIDENTIAL

E-1A L116 (146)

Gaw 145

CYPHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD 101000Z

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TO ROUTINE MODUK TEL OF 10 OCTOBER 1974, INFO **TOP COPY**
ROUTINE FCO (FOR DEF AND ME DEPTS).

DIG EBR/OGU.
FROM DA.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 27 11 OCT 1974 NBR 10/1

CYMBELINE FOR IRAQ.

1. THE FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM IRAQ MOD :

"SUBJECT CONTRACT 73 ARMAMENTS AND SUPPLIES 91 RADAR CYMBELINE. ABOVE CONTRACT HAS BEEN SIGNED WITH EMI TO FURNISH US WITH CYMBELINE RADAR. CONTRACT PROVIDES THAT WE SHALL PAY THE COMPANY AN ADVANCE PAYMENT OF 30% OF TOTAL VALUE OF CONTRACT AGAINST A LETTER OF GUARANTEE TO BE SUBMITTED BY THE COMPANY WITHIN 2 WEEKS FROM DATE OF EXPORT CERTIFICATE ISSUED BY THE BRITISH GOVT. YOU ARE KINDLY REQUESTED TO MEDIATE WITH YOUR GOVT. TO GRANT THE COMPANY THE SAID CERTIFICATE FOR THE PURPOSE OF IMPLEMENTING THIS CONTRACT."

2. THIS IS PART OF A MOUNTING CAMPAIGN TO GET A DEFINITIVE ANSWER ON WHEN HMG WILL APPROVE EXPORT LICENCE FOR AN EQPT IRAQIS NEED URGENTLY AND WHICH WE HAVE TOLD THEM WE AGREE TO SUPPLY.

3. SUBSTANTIVE REPLY REFERRED TO IN FCO TEL NO 249 OF 4 OCT NOT YET RECEIVED.

4. GRATEFUL YOUR ADVICE.

GRAHAM

[SENT TO DCC]

DEFENCE DEPT
MED
MR THOMSON
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 50

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

(147)

CYPHER CAT A

E + 1A 11/10.

FM BAGHDAD 101006Z OCT. 1974

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 365 OF 10 OCTOBER 1974.

RECEIVED IN
REC'D
14 OCT 1974
NBR 16/1

YOUR TEL NO 249 : ARMS SALES.

1. IRAQIS HAVE NOW SIGNED A CONTRACT FOR CYMBELINE
(SEE DEFENCE ATTACHE'S TEL NO EBR/OGU 101000Z TO MODUK).
THIS DEVELOPMENT GREATLY STRENGTHENS THE ARGUMENT IN
GIDDENS'S TEL NO 342. ANY DELAY IS LIKELY TO BE LAID
AT HMG'S DOOR.

GRAHAM

FILES

MED

DEFENCE DEPT

MR CAMPBELL

MR WEIR


CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY (147A)

GR 80
PRIORITY
CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

FM F C O 111715Z



(NBR 10/1)

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD TELNO 254 OF 11 OCTOBER 1974.

PERSONAL FROM HEAD OF MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT

YOUR TELNO 365: CYMBELINE

STRICTLY FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, M O D REQUIREMENT IN PARA 2 OF MY TELNO 235 RELATED TO SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS WHICH ARE UNDER URGENT REVIEW. WE HAVE EXPRESSED SUPPORT AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL FOR A MODIFICATION TO ENABLE CYMBELINE TO BE DELIVERED WITHIN A YEAR, BUT YOU SHOULD NOT (NOT) SAY ANYTHING TO THE IRAQIS UNTIL WE ARE IN A POSITION TO SEND YOU INSTRUCTIONS.

CALLAGHAN

FILES

MED

DEFENCE D

MR. WEIR

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01- 930 8440 ext 664

(148)

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY NO 35
14 OCT 1974
NBR 10/1
11 October 1974

I S MacDonald Esq
Head of Defence Sales 1
Ministry of Defence
Stuart House
Soho Square
LONDON

Your reference

Our reference

Date

14 OCT 1974

NBR 10/1

11 October 1974

CYMBELINE

1. My letter NBR 10/1 of 7 October refers.
2. You will have seen from Baghdad telegrams to MODUK No 101000Z Oct and to FCO No 365, that the Iraqis have signed the EMI contract for the purchase of Cymbeline and that they have formally requested the Embassy to facilitate the issue of an export licence.
3. As I mentioned in my letter of 7 October, the EMI contract undertakes to deliver the first unit of Cymbeline one year after the "effective date" of the contract. It follows from this that any delivery delay of more than twelve months will make it immediately clear to the Iraqis that restrictions have been imposed by HMG. Similarly, any undue delay over the issue of an export licence will now become known to them and will be very badly received. It becomes therefore far more important that the proposed reconsideration of the present MOD restriction should be proceeded with at the earliest possible opportunity in the hope that the period of delay may be shortened.

P R H Wright
Middle East Department

Cc:-

H R Braden Esq
Head of DS 13
MOD

Defence Department
FCO

CONFIDENTIAL

TO
HED

From: O. Ogden, Sales Supply 5b, Room 1144



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation

St Christopher House Southwark Street London SE1

Telephone 01-928 7999 ext 3631

NBR 10/11

(149)
Mr Latham MEd.

Any objections pre?

Your reference

Cairn Lane

Miss M R McIntosh,
FCO Defence Department,
Downing Street,
London, SW1.

Our reference D/Sales/
523/10/12

Date 11 October, 1974.

No objection

17/10/74
1A 12/10

Dear Miss McIntosh,

We have been approached by the UK firm of Ascot Stilton Company about an enquiry they have received from Iraq for the supply of the following items:

- 1. Qty. 15 Needle & Pivot Compass
- 2. " 10 Compass Needle
- 3. " 20 Bubble Spirit Circular
- 4. " 10 Lens eye
- 5. " 10 Eye piece assy.
- 6. " 1 Saddle for 25 Pdr. No.1 Mk.1
- 7. " 2 " " " " No.3 Mk.1

Dft MOD

P2
C 18/10

Items 1-5 are spare parts for Director No.7 Mk.5

Will you please advise if there is any objection to the supply of these items to Iraq.

Yours sincerely

Copy to:

Head of DS 13

MOD DS 13b

MOD Defence Policy Staff

DTI (ELB)

Treasury (Defence Materiel Dept.)

Sales 1b



(150)

M2

GRS 105

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 151010Z OCT.

CONFIDENTIAL

17 OCT 1974
NR 10/1

TOP COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 373 OF 15 OCTOBER 1974.

DEFENCE SALES.

1. IN WHAT WAS INTENDED AS A FIRST CALL, THE ACTING MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (HISHAM AL SHAWI) ASKED ME TO-DAY WHETHER HMG WOULD BE WILLING IN PRINCIPLE TO SUPPLY, OR AUTHORISE SUPPLY BY THE MANUFACTURERS OF, TWO TYPES OF BOMB CONTAINER FOR AIRCRAFT. IF WE WERE WILLING, THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW MANY CONTAINERS WE COULD SUPPLY (I WAS TOLD THAT THEY WOULD TAKE AS MANY AS WE COULD SPARE) AND HOW SOON ? THEY ARE URGENTLY NEEDED.

2. THE DETAILS ARE :

BOMB CONTAINER TYPE RBK-250-275 AO-1-STCH
-DO- RBK-250 ZAB-2,5

MY DEFENCE ATTACHE IS MAKING FURTHER ENQUIRIES AND WILL TELEGRAPH ANY FURTHER DETAILS HE MAY BE ABLE TO OBTAIN.

GRAHAM

FILES
DEFENCE D
MED
SIR G ARTHUR
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. McDonald Director
Mod Sales
Mr. Gurnitt Mod Sales
The R.H.A.
Ry

FO 706E 16/16

NBR1011

(1974)

151

LKS NR 016/16

PP MODUK

RR FCO

GRS 50

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 160610Z OCT.

MOD DISTRIBUTION

~~MED~~

N. R. Tomy

W. A. Ray

R E S T R I C T E D

TO PRIORITY MODUK TEL OF 16 OCTOBER 1974, INFO
ROUTINE FCO.

DIG EBR/EDW.
FROM DA.

HUNTER A/C SPARES.

1. IRAQ MOD URGENTLY REQUIRES AS MANY OF THE FOLLOWING
AS WE CAN PROVIDE.

ALPHA. BOMB CONTAINER TYPE RBK-250-275 AO-1-STCH

BRAVO. BOMB CONTAINER TYPE RBK-250 (ZAB-2.5)

2. PLEASE SIGNAL ANSWER ASAP.

GRAHAM
BT

(152)

TOP COPY

GRS 65/2

RESTRICTED

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 161030Z OCT

RESTRICTED

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 17 OCT 1974 NBR P/1

ETA 17/10

TO PRIORITY MODUK TELNO 161030Z OCT INFO ROUTINE FCO.
DIG OGU/EBR.

FROM DA FOR GRIFFIN. MDS3 AND DEFENCE SALES 1B

ENGINEER EQPT FOR IRAQ ARMY MY OGU/EBR 100730Z OCT REFERS.

1. 3 IRAQI OFFICERS WILL NOT NOW GO TO UK UNTIL MID NOVEMBER.
THEY WILL CONFIRM DATES WITH ME END OCT EARLY NOV (PARA 4
REF REFERS).

2. PLEASE INFO FAIREYS AND TRY AND CO-ORDINATE TO PREVENT
DUPLICATION BETWEEN FAIREYS AND MYSELF.

GRAHAM

BT


FILES
MED
DEFENCE DEPT
MR WEIR
MR THOMSON

[SENT TO DCC]

RESTRICTED

LOOSE MINUTE

D/DS13/709/19

GS(OR)1 Sy
ATI (F&C)Copies to:
D Sales 1
Sales 1b
1(AG)4CYMBELINE TO IRAQ

1. The loose minute from GS(OR)1 Sy A/57/O'Seas/1106 dated 14 Oct 74 gave AD agreement to the sale of the Mk 1 version of Cymbeline to Iraq in December 1975.
2. As you probably know, the firm, when negotiating with the Iraqis, did not give a firm delivery date but quoted 12 months from the effective date of contract, which was to be the date of UK agreement to issue an export licence. The Iraqis brought severe pressure to bear on the FCO to agree that there would be no objection to the issue of a licence and they have been given to understand that there will be no problem. This leaves us with an effective date of contract of mid October with a six week gap between the contract date of delivery (mid October 1975) and the December 1975 timescale agreed by the Army Department. This situation could cause considerable political embarrassment to the UK Government.
3. It may well be possible to bridge this gap by providing training for the Iraqis in this country on an equipment delivered in the UK in the custody of the Army Department. Such training would have to be provided around Sept/Oct/Nov 1975 as the Iraqis would obviously expect the equipment to be transferred to Iraq when training had been completed.
4. I would be grateful if you could say as a matter of urgency:
 - a. If there is any security objection to the proposal.
 - b. If it is possible to provide training in the timescale Sept/Oct/Nov on an equipment delivered by EMI in the UK.

16 Oct 74

Mr. Raftery
MB 1
wace.A J DAVIS
DS13a
MB 0196 6377 MB

X I have told Mr. Davis that we have not gone as far as this with the Iraqis: we have only undertaken to look into their request for assistance to keep the maintenance down to the minimum.

Mr. Raftery
18.10.74.

(154)

R131

ROOM 3 PLEASE PASS TO:-
EXAMINERS

2257

OK

MOD DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Raftery

125

VZCZCFA138
DSAC - T - HDA BAGHDAD
ECO MED
DE REDWC 0655 2892130
ROUTINE 161525Z OCT
FM MCDUK
TO BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD
INFO ECO MED
BT
CONFIDENTIAL
DIG EBR/LPE

FROM SALES 1B. SIMFIRE. FURTHER TO YOUR 080730Z AND OUR 100730Z
OCT, SOLARTRON THINK THAT YOU MAY BE INTERESTED TO KNOW THAT
THEY EXPECT TO SIGN CONTRACT NEXT WEEK IN SYRIA FOR 300 UNITS
OF SIMFIRE VALUE THREE MILLION POUNDS. FIRM AWAITING INFO FROM
THEIR IRAQI AGENT PRIOR TO ACTION RE IRAQ.
BT

Q11 21/10
Wm K NENAD
Thm B-PA

NNNN

R18/4

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRATION
22 OCT 94
18R10/1

Main Building Whitehall London SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-930 7022 ext 6855

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRATION

17 OCT 1974

less wt.

Your reference

Our reference

DS1 3/709/19

Date _____

16 October 1974

NBR 10/1

Dear Patrick,

A. Raftery fir.

CYMBELINE - IRAQ

-(132) -(148)

1. Your letters of 7 and 11 October to Ian McDonald, copied to me, sought a relaxation in the security ruling so that the delivery date for Cymbeline to Iraq could be brought forward. The interested parties in MOD have now been consulted and have reluctantly agreed that delivery of the MKI version can be brought forward to December 1975 on the grounds that delivery was made to Egypt in July 1974.
2. This is the second concession the Services have made on Cymbeline to Iraq and I feel that it is going to be very difficult to get any further advance of the delivery date.
3. If you feel that an offer to deliver an equipment in this country for training purposes at an earlier date would sweeten the pill I will try it out on the Army Department.

Yours aye

Henry

H R BRADEN

Copies to:
D Sales 1
FCO Defence Dept

the JV concession was to allow the sale at all.

17/6

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED
17 OCT 1974
NBR 10/1

er/A (156)
f.7h

H R Braden Esq
DS 13
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
SW1

Your reference

Our reference


Date 17 October 1974

Dear Hugh.

CYMBELINE FOR IRAQ

(155)

1. Thank you very much for your letter of 16 October, in which you reported that the security ruling has been amended to allow delivery of Cymbeline to Iraq by December 1975.
2. I am most grateful for this concession, which represents a considerable improvement on the previous ruling even though the terms of EMI's contract with the Iraqis will I fear mean that it will still be apparent to the Iraq Government that HMG have imposed restrictions on the delivery of the equipment. They will also be disappointed (or profess to be disappointed) that we had been unable to persuade EMI to improve on the delivery delay of one year.
3. The Iraqi Foreign Minister is likely to be passing through London again this weekend and it may be that we shall have some official contact with him. If the subject is again raised I shall let you know at once. Meanwhile I can confirm that it would certainly ease our problems if it were possible for us to offer the Iraqis training facilities in this country at a date earlier than December 1975. It would certainly be within the terms of our Ministers' views if such facilities could be made available from 9 months of the date of delivery to Egypt. I should therefore be most grateful if you could try this out on the Army Department as you suggest.


P R H Wright
Middle East Department

cc I McDonald Esq
MOD Sales
Stuart House
Soho Square
W1

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-


(157)

O Ogun Esq
Sales Supply 5b
Ministry of Defence
St Christopher House

Your reference

Our reference

Date 21 October 1974



!n. k21/10

Dear Ogun,

(149) —

1. Thank you for your letter D/Sales/523/10/12 of 11 October 1974.
2. There is no political objection to the supply of Spare parts for Director No 7 Mk 5 and 1 Saddle for 25 Pdr No 1 Mk 1 and 2 Saddle for 25 Pdr No 3 Mk 1 to Iraq.
3. I am copying this letter to the other members of the Arms Working Party.

Yours sincerely

C G Lane

C G LANE
Defence Department

(158)

IT	1	DIN
N 35		
23 OCT 1974		
NBR 10/11/619/20		

TOP COPY

~~DFA115~~

DSAO-T-RR-BRITEMB BAGHDAD

~~-T-RR-FCO MED~~

~~DE RBDWC 0304 2951516~~

ROUTINE 221000Z OCT

FM MODUK

TO BRITEMB BAGHDAD

INFO FCO (MED)

BT

R E S T R I C T E D

DIG EBR/EDW

FROM SALES 1B. YOUR EBR/EDW 160610Z OCT. CANNOT IDENTIFY
EQUIPMENT FROM INFORMATION GIVEN. COULD WE HAVE FULLER
DESCRIPTION AND ALTERNATIVE PART NUMBER IF POSSIBLE PLEASE.

BT

NO DISTRIBUTION

MED

[Repeated as requested]

NNNN

(159)

TOP COPY

EGDEA116

REC. 17 D. 11
REC. 17 N. 35
23 OCT 1974
NBR 10/1

1620/22

NO DISTRIBUTION

R124/NE

DSAO-T-RF-FCO MED

DE RBDWG 0377 2951534

ROUTINE 221300Z OCT

FM MODUK

TO BRITDEFAT DUBAI

INFO BRITEMB ABU DHABI

ZEN/FCO MED

BT

UNCLAS

DIG EDB/OQA/LPE

FROM SALES 1C PD REF YOUR 070800Z OCT PD SCORPION ENGINE AND GEAR-
BOX PD HAVE ALREADY TAKEN ACTION ON YOUR REQUEST AND WILL ADVISE
COLLECTION DETAILS AS SOON AS FORMAL APPROVAL HAS BEEN GIVEN
BT

NNNN

GRS 200

CONFIDENTIAL


PRIORITY

CYPHER/CAT A

FM FCO 221540Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY TEHRAN TELNO 428 OF 22ND OCTOBER 1974 INFO BAGHDAD
KUWAIT JEDDA.



(160)
COPY

MY TEL NO 368: ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

1. THE IRAQIS HAVE SIGNED A CONTRACT FOR THE PURCHASE OF CYMBELINE.
HOWEVER, YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THERE IS A PROBLEM ON DELIVERY AND
WE CANNOT AT PRESENT REGARD THE ORDER AS ABSOLUTELY FIRM.

2. THERE ARE A FURTHER FOUR ORDERS FOR IRAQ UNDER CONSIDERATION, VIZ
BRIDGING EQUIPMENT (£5 MILLION), ALUMINIUM RUNWAYS (£5M), ARTILLERY
RANGE-SOUNDING SYSTEMS (£2.4M) AND 1,250 NIGHT-VISION UNITS FOR
ARMoured VEHICLES (£29M). THE FIRST THREE ITEMS ARE MINOR
EQUIPMENT AND WE ARE GIVING POLITICAL CLEARANCE FOR THEIR SALE.
HOWEVER, WE CONSIDER THAT THE NIGHT-VISION UNITS, BOTH BECAUSE
OF THEIR NATURE AND THE SCALE OF THE ORDER, MIGHT CONCEIVABLY
CAUSE THE IRANIANS CONCERN, ALTHOUGH AS YOU KNOW THEIR OWN ARMOUR
IS ALREADY WELL EQUIPPED IN THIS RESPECT. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL
THEREFORE FOR YOUR ADVICE ON WHETHER WE SHOULD SOUND OUT THE SHAH
BEFORE WE DECIDE TO ALLOW THIS ORDER. THE MANUFACTURERS HAVE
MADE A STRONG APPEAL TO MOD SALES TO ALLOW THIS SALE, WHICH THEY
SAY WOULD SOLVE THEIR CURRENT LIQUIDITY PROBLEMS (IT HAS ALREADY
BEEN SOLD TO EGYPT AND LIBYA).

3. AS WITH CYMBELINE AND THE HAWK, THE MANUFACTURERS WILL BE ASKED
NOT TO SEEK PUBLICITY FOR ANY OF THESE SALES.

CALLAGHAN

FILES

MED

DEFENCE DEPT

MR. WEIR

COPIES TO

MOD DS13

DIRECTOR SALES

(166) refer

CONFIDENTIAL

17 130
LH 384E



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation Sales 1b

Stuart House 23 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ

Telex 23605

Telephone 01-437 0200 ext
Direct Line 01-632 4709
Switchboard 632 3333

28 OCT 1974
NBR 10/1

161
dur Raftery
Any objections please?

Chris Lane 23/10
Defence Dept

Miss McIntosh
Defence Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
London SW1

Your reference

Our reference

D/Sales/113/18/1

Date D/Sales/113/112/3
6 October 1974

Dear Miss McIntosh

ARMS WORKING PARTY CLEARANCES

Could we have an indication of your Department's view to the sale of the equipment described below please?

- 1 Country: IRAQ
 - 2 Description: COMBAT ENGINEER TRACTOR(FV180). A versatile, amphibious, armoured tracked engineering vehicle with mobility equal to that of battlegroup vehicles.
 - 3 Security classification of equipment: UNCLASSIFIED
 - 4 Time scale: 1977
 - 5 Further information: The CET, developed by the Military Vehicles and Engineering Establishment, is now undergoing British Army user trials. The Iraqi Government has asked for a priced offer for quantity 5 vehicles. - value £105 000 each
= £525 000 approx
- I am copying this letter to the other members of the AWP.


Yours sincerely

D A Grossman

Copies to: Mr H R Braden - DS13
Mr M Esau - DS13b
Mr W P Cassell - Treasury
Mr P T Durnell - DoT(EPB)
Lt Col C W A Napier - DPS(Cteam)

No objection but we would like to know the value of the sale.

I have 28/10



Dr Raftery again to see approx value
C 29/10

LH 384E



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation

Sales 1b

Stuart House 23 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ

Telex 23605

Telephone 01-437 9288 ext
Direct Line 01-632 4709
Switchboard 632 3333

NBR 10/1(162)

Mr. Lane.

→ Enter MED

Mr Raftery

Any objections pre?

Your reference

Colin & Lane 23/10
Defence Dept

Our reference

D/Sales/113/18/1

Date D/Sales/113/112/3
16 October 1974

Miss M R McIntosh
Defence Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
London SW1

Dear Miss McIntosh

ARMS WORKING PARTY CLEARANCES

Could we have an indication of your Department's view to the release of the equipment described below please?

- 1 Country: IRAQ
- 2 Description: POWERED RAFT CLASS 16. Lightweight, hand-erected, air-portable powered raft.
- 3 Security Classification of equipment: UNCLASSIFIED
- 4 Further information: The Iraqi Government has asked for a priced offer for two sets of components. The manufacturer is Laird(Anglesey) Limited.

I am copying this letter to the other members of the AWP.

value £760,000
approx.

Yours sincerely


D A Grossman

No objection but may we please
know the value of the sale.

Copies to: Mr H R Braden - DS13
Mr M Esau - DS13b
Mr W P Cassell - Treasury
Mr P T Durnell - DoT (EPB)
Lt Col C W A Napier - DPS (C team)
~~Mr T E Nissen - D/Sales Supply~~

1. Hall 24/10

① Dft. Mod.
② Mr Raftery again 29/10.
to see approx value.
15/11



pa
C 19/11

LH 384E



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation Sales 1b

Stuart House 23 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ

Telex 23605

Telephone 01-437 9288 ext
Direct Line 01-632 4709
Switchboard 632 3333

28 OCT 1974
NBR 10/1

Mr Raftery
→ *Enter miss (18)*
Mr Raftery.
Any objections pre?

Miss M R McIntosh
Defence Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
London SW1

Your reference

Our reference
D/Sales/113/18/1
Date D/Sales/113/81/1
16 October 1974

Colin G Lane
Defence Dept
23/10

Dear *Miss McIntosh*

ARMS WORKING PARTY CLEARANCES

has been providing a military
assessment of both the Gazelle
lynx. R+P.A. (28/10)

Could we have an indication of your Department's view to the sale of the aircraft described below please?

- 1 Country: Iraq
- 2 Description of aircraft: GAZELLE A High performance lightweight helicopter for use in military reconnaissance, artillery observation, troop and supply transport and casualty evacuation roles.
- 3 Security classification of equipment: UNCLASSIFIED (basic airframe and engine)
- 4 Further information: Our Defence Attaché in Baghdad has informed us that the Director of Supply, IAF, has expressed interest in Gazelle and Lynx, both of which are manufactured by Westland-Aerospatiale. You will recall that we have already raised a request in respect of Lynx, following an approach from Westland, (our letter of 12 August refers).

I am copying this letter to the other members of the AWP.

Yours sincerely
D A Grossman


D A Grossman

Copies to: Mr H R Braden - DS13
Mr M J Esau - DS13b
Mr I McCall - DS13c
Mr W P Cassell - Treasury
Mr P T Durnell - DoT (EPB)
Lt Col C W A Napier - DPS (Cteam)



(164)

CONFIDENTIAL



COPY

GRS 150
PRIORITY
CYPHER CAT A
FM TEHRAN 240830Z
CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 568 OF 24 OCTOBER. 1974.
INFO BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, JEDDA.

YOUR TEL NO 428: ARMS SALES TO IRAQ

1. I RECEIVED YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE A FEW MINUTES BEFORE SETTING OFF FOR MY AUDIENCE WITH THE SHAH. SINCE I SHALL BE UNLIKELY TO SEE HIM AGAIN ALONE FOR A FEW WEEKS, I DECIDED TO TAKE THE PLUNGE, BEARING IN MIND HIS FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE ON THE LAST OCCASION.

2. I ACCORDINGLY GAVE HIM A BRIEF RUN DOWN ON THE SITUATION, MENTIONING IN PARTICULAR THAT THE IRAQIS WERE INTERESTED IN NIGHT VISION UNITS FOR ARMoured VEHICLES. THE SHAH SAID THAT HIS ANSWER WAS THE SAME. IF THE IRAQIS DID NOT GET THEM FROM US, THEY WOULD GET THEM FROM SOMEONE ELSE. HENCE, WE WOULD NOT BE INCREASING THEIR AGGRESSIVE POTENTIAL AND HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE BUSINESS ~~TO~~ GO TO US.

PARSONS

FILES
MED
DEFENCE D
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR
SIR G ARTHUR
MR THOMSON

COPIES TO: DS 13 MOD

DIRECTOR OF SALES MOD

CONFIDENTIAL

166 refs

RESTRICTED

Entw + 1A

(165)

L241

29 OCT 1974
NBR 10/1



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Main Building Whitehall London SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 7212 (Direct Dialling)
01-218 9000 (Switchboard) Ext 7212

Room 0211 MB

Your reference

Distribution below.

Our reference MDS3/20/53/5

Date 25 October 1974

PROPOSED VISIT OF 3 IRAQI ENGINEER OFFICERS OCT / NOV 1974

1. Approaches have been made by the Iraq Ministry of Defence to our Embassy in Baghdad, and to various companies in the UK by the Iraq Embassy in London, for emergency bridging equipment and a quantity of other Military Engineer stores. The list includes:

Equipment

FV 180 Combat Engineer Tractor
Medium Girder Bridge
Clear Span Bridge Class 16
Power Raft Class 16
Class 60 and Class 30 Track Way
Assault Tank Centurion AVRE
Giant Viper
Baby Viper
Bar Mine Layer
Trench Digging & Cratering Explosive Kits
Portable Roadways
Armoured Plant
Airfield Landing Mat
Field Medical Unit Tentage

Possibly Demonstrated at/by:

RSME/MVEE
RSME or RE Bridging Camp
" " " " "
" " " " "
RSME
RAC Centre
RAC Centre
School of Infantry
RSME
RSME
RSME
RSME/MVEE
RSME or UKLF Unit-?
UKLF Unit-?

2. Fairey Engineering have been pressing for some time to get a visit arranged and had indeed invited officers to come here under their sponsorship. They were pressing for them to come in October but the only response the Iraqis would make was that they might come at a week's notice.

3. There has been, however, as can be seen from para 1 above, a wider aspect of such a visit and, at the request of the Embassy in Baghdad, we are drawing the threads together and hoping to make it somewhat more co-ordinated and not at such absurdly short notice.

Restricted

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

4. We have proposed that the visit should take place not before the third week in November and be of 7 - 10 days duration, either arriving in time to attend the Rapid Runway Repair demonstration at RAF Widenrath on 18 Nov or arriving after this event. We would be grateful if you would let us know whether visits to you could be accepted during, say, the last two weeks in November to demonstrate and present equipment as above.

P.S.D. Griffin

P.S.D. GRIFFIN
Lt.Colonel
RO 1
Head of MDS3
MB 0211 3105MB

25 Oct 74

External

HQ UKLF G (SD)
HQ UKLF Engineer Branch
HQ RAC Centre, Bovington
HQ School of Infantry
HQ MVEE, Chobham
HQ MVEE, Christchurch

MOD

HQ E-in-C (Army)
DAT Co-ord
ER 2
Sy 2(A)
Sy 2(PE)

ROS
MD/MS
AUS (Sales)
MD/MS
Sales
Sales Supply

FCO (MED)


THIS
COPY
FOR

RESTRICTED

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 270930Z OCT

SECRET



1974

TO PRIORITY MODUK TELNO 270930Z OCTOBER, INFO ROUTINE FCO.

DIG EBR/LPE

FROM DA FOR MCDONALD DEFENCE SALES 1.

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ.

160 FCO TELNO 428 OF 22 OCT TO TEHRAN IS REF A.

164 TEHRAN TELNO 568 OF 24 OCT IS REF B.

ONE. REF A LISTS FOUR ITEMS OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT (BRIDGING £5M, ALUMINIUM RUNWAYS £5M, ARTY RANGE SOUNDING SYSTEMS £2.4M AND NIGHT VISION UNITS FOR ARMD VEHICLES £2.9M) WHICH ARE AT PAESNT UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR IRAQ.

TWO. WE KNOW ABOUT THE FIRST TWO ITEMS FOR WHICH AN IRAQI TEAM OF ARMY ENGINEERS WILL SHORTLY BE COMING TO UK TO DISCUSS WITH MOD AND FAIREY ENGINEERING.

THREE. WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING ABOUT THE LATTER TWO ITEMS. THIS IS NOT SURPRISING IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT IRAQ TENDS TO GO STRAIGHT TO BRITISH FIRMS AND BRITISH FIRMS OFTEN FAIL TO KEEP US INFORMED. WE INVARIABLY GET INVTLVED WHEN THINGS GO WRONG AND IT IS EMBARASSING TO KNOW NOTHING ABOUT A POTENTIAL SALE WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR SOME WEEKS.

Telegram
E + QA. (28/10.)
(166)

SECRET

FOUR. AS THE MATTER HAS NOW BEEN RAISED WITH TEHRAN WE WOULD APPRECIATE DETAILS OF LATTER TWO ITEMS AND IN FUTURE A SITREP OF CURRENT DEMANDS WHICH HAVE BYPASSED US.

FIVE. DIRECTOR OF AIR SUPPLY TODAY INFORMED ME OF :

ALPHA. VISIT ONE MONTH AGO OF WESTLAND A/C MAINTENANCE STAFF TO SORT OUT PROBLEMS DATING FROM 1969 OF WESSEX SPARE PARTS.

BRAVO. VISIT OF JOYCE, SALES MANAGER OF WESTLANDS TO DISCUSS BID FOR 30 GAZELLE AND 40 LYNX HELICOPTERS FROM 19 TO 21 OCTOBER. I AM WAITING FOR AN ANSWER TO MY ERB 090530Z OCTOBER WARNING ON THIS SUBJECT.

CHARLIE. HAWKER SIDDELEY'S FAILURE TO RESPOND TO 3 REQUESTS OVER PAST MONTH TO COME TO BAGHDAD TO DISCUSS SALE OF 30 HS HAWK TRAINERS.

SIX. ON VISIT TO IRAQ NAVY 20-23 OCTOBER IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THEY ARE ABOUT TO LAUNCH A RAPID EXPANSION PROGRAMME. ALTHOUGH THEY DID NOT ASK FOR SHIPS THEY SAID TJUY WANTED TO PURCHASE HOVERCRAFT (I BELIEVE THE SHAH WAS APPROACHED ON THIS 18 MONTHS AGO), RADAR AND NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT AND INSTRUCTIONAL EQUIPMENT (NAVIGATIONAL, ELECTRONIC, GUNNERY, HYDROGRAPHICAL) FOR THEIR NEW NAVAL ACADEMY AT PRESENT UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND DUE TO OPEN AUTUMN 1975. COMD IRAQI NAVY WAS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF THE LACK OF BRITISH NAVAL EQUIPMENT CATALOGUES FROM COMMERCIAL FIRMS AND CITED FRANCE AS A SHINING EXAMPLE OF WHAT SHOULD BE DONE. THEY SAID THEY INTEND SENDING A PURCHASING MISSION TO UK NEXT MONTH.

SEVEN. IN VIEW OF ALL THIS FORECAST IN MY LETTER OF 18 FEB 74 ON DEF SALES TO IRAQ AND THE DESIRE OF THE IRAQIS TO BUY BRITISH IF POSSIBLE I AM PREPARING A FULL LETTRW ON THE SUBJECT IN THE HOPES THAT YOUR ORG AND MDS WILL BE MORE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN WHAT IS A POTENTIALLY VERY RICH MARKET.

GRAHAM

FILES

MED

DEFENCE DEPT
MR WEIR

[SENT TO DCC MOD]

2
SECRET

COPIES TO

DS 13 MOD


DIRECTOR OF SALES MOD

non re Part B

(167)

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 50
PRIORITY
CYPHER/CAT A



FM FC0 281830Z

(NBR 10/1)

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD TELNO 276 OF 28 OCTOBER, 1974
YOUR DEFENCE ATTACHES TELEGRAM TO MODUK NO 270930Z REFERS:
DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ

1. WE SHALL BE INTERESTED IN SEEING MAJOR SANDERS' REPORT
WHICH WE ASSUME TAKES INTO FULL ACCOUNT OUR VERY RESTRICTIVE POLICY
TOWARDS DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ (PARA 2 OF OUR TELEGRAM NO 322 TO
TEHRAN REFERS).

CALLAGHAN

FILES
MED
DEFENCE D
MR WEIR
MR THOMSON

COPIES TO
DS 13 MOD
DIRECTOR SALES (1) MOD

CONFIDENTIAL

Manor Royal
Crawley
Sussex RH10 2PZ

Telegrams Quipmet-Crawley

RECEIVED IN
N 35
31 OCT 1974

(169)

COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL

DEFENCE SYSTEMS DIVISION

Our ref: D180/3190/LGN/kg

18th September, 1974

Mr. R. Anderson,
AUS/SALES,
Ministry of Defence,
Main Building,
Whitehall,
London SW1

Dear Mr. Anderson,

cc Mr G Williams

NKVA

Mr. Raftery

MK 1 &

Mr. Denmark

We have outstanding export licence applications for MK2 equipment to Syria & Libya & Iraq. NKVA are looking urgently at Syria but are awaiting MoD comments on the other two.

*He! DS 13
Let's all the
best recent*

Act. 1/10/74

UKMA Inter 16/10/74

I am writing to you personally as the difficulties my Company have experienced in exporting Military Defence equipment during the past twelve months are rapidly coming to a head, and in the hope that you will lend your support to the immediate granting of Export Licences to alleviate the situation.

I refer in general to export to the Arab countries in the Middle East and in particular to Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt and Libya. These countries have large quantities of the older type of Russian tank for which we have engineered opto-electronic systems to provide night-driving and night-fighting capabilities. Prior to the last outbreak of hostilities and in spite of a great many uncertainties, and considerable risk, we achieved as a Company a fair measure of success in Egypt and Libya, as your regional Directors will testify.

As a result we were approached also by the other three countries and the initial discussions were very favourable, that is until we were refused permission to export by H.M.G. This was after the cessation of hostilities and extended even to temporary export for demonstration only.

Consequently we have lost credibility as an exporting Company to this part of the World, where we have some thirty to fifty million pounds of potential export business in jeopardy.

In our systems we include items from other European countries who previously had an embargo on direct exports to the Middle East but who now have no such inhibitions and are already becoming strongly competitive. Some of these countries may keep up the pretence of an embargo but I can give you several recent instances of devious evasion by them to filch this business.

185/45

Cont/d

Mr. R. Anderson

18th September, 1974

As we are allowed only low profit margins by H.M.G. on Military Defence equipment contracts we naturally look to our exports to redress the balance and make the whole business viable. We must therefore export such equipment to those countries who wish to buy it and have the money to pay for it. Export restrictions have never in the past been an effective deterrent but have only increased the business risk run by Companies such as ours.

Furthermore our policy, in the past, which has been encouraged by H.M.G. has been to sell "last generation" defence equipment to these countries and some items of our systems still fall into that category. These potential sales alone, however, could net H.M.G. an amount approaching one million pounds in Royalties.

One last point, may I say in confidence, that in common with many other electronic companies engaged in Military Defence Equipment we are at the present time facing cash liquidity difficulties and if we could obtain one or more of these export contracts the 40% Advance payment would solve our problems.

I wish therefore to make a strong appeal to you - and through you to H.M.G. for help and advice, and will be pleased to call at any time most convenient to you, to enlarge on, and give more details of, those aspects which are best not written.

Yours sincerely,
for THE M.E.L. EQUIPMENT COMPANY LTD.

George Nuttall
L. G. Nuttall
EXPORT MANAGER

c.c. Air Vice Marshal C. W. Coulthard

LOOSE MINUTE

D/DS13/363/3/2
Copy on: D/DS13/178

DPS(C) Team (Lt Col Napier)

Copies to:

Naval Plans

MOI

Air Plans

DIS(CS)

MD/HDS

AUS/Sales

D Sales 1

D Sales Supply


AD Sales 1b

FCO(MED)

FCO(Defence Department)

Department of Trade (ELB)

DS13a



SALES OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT TO IRAQ

Reference:

DPS(C)154/DPS(C)304 dated 1 Oct 74

1. Thank you for your minute at reference.
2. I have discussed this matter with DIS(CS) and we have agreed to establish a drill which will provide the FCO, as occasion warrants, with the military assessment on which they can base their political judgement. This drill is set out in the attached DS13b internal instruction which I am copying to you for information. DS13a have established a similar routine with DIS(CS) to cover equipment being cleared through the RMIES.

14 Oct 74

M. R. PACK

M R PACK

DS13b

MB 0213 6279 MB

LOOSE MINUTE

D/DS13/363/3/2

Copy on:

D/DS13/178

Miss Hosier

Miss Davis

Mrs Harris

Copy to:

Mr Fayle

Mr Esau

Mr Burton

SALES TO IRAQ: DS13b INSTRUCTION NO 15

1. In July the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee of the Cabinet endorsed a proposal (OPD(74)27) by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary that on sales to Iraq:

"we should continue to maintain a very restrictive policy, limiting supplies to minor equipment and we should ensure that no equipment is supplied which might significantly increase Iraqi capabilities in any future conflict with Israel."

2. In order that the FCO may give effect to this ruling DS13 has undertaken to refer all AWP clearances and export licences for the sale of equipment to Iraq to DI(AG)4. RMIES clearances are already referred to DI(AG)4. DI(AG)4 will provide DS13b with a military assessment on which the FCO may base their political judgement and copy this to:

Hd DS13

FCO(MED)

FCO (Defence Department)

3. The assessment undertaken by DI(AG)4 in no way obviates the need for full AWP (or RMIES) clearance.

14 Oct 74

M R PACK

DS13b

MB 0213 6279 MB

CONFIDENTIAL
1974
CONFIDENTIAL

LOOSE MINUTE

DS 13a

Copies to: 1(AG)4
AT 1 (F & C)
D Sales 1
Sales 1b

REC'D
REG'D
31 OCT 1974
NBR 16/1

*Mr. Rafting
ms).*

CYMBELINE TO IRAQ

Reference A: LM to D/DS13/709/19 dated 16 Oct 74.

We foresee no equipment security objections to the proposal to train Iraqis on a Mk I Cymbeline equipment in this country in the custody of the Army Department.

18 Oct 74

R C Plummer
R C PLUMMER
Lt Col
GS(OR)1
MB Ext 7468

CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL**



DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
Export Licensing Branch
Sanctuary Buildings
16-20 Great Smith Street London SW1P 3DB

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY 35
Telephone 01-215 4237/8
01-222 7077 ext

31 OCT 1974

NBR 16/11

Your reference

Our reference 1A/4057/74

Date

1RAD

Attached is a copy of particulars of an application to export goods controlled under legislation at present in force.

Is there any objection to the issue of a licence in this case please:

Signed W. KAVANAGH (MISS)

Date 18 OCT 1974

Referred to:-

~~Foreign & Commonwealth Office~~
~~Ministry of Defence (DS8A)~~
~~Ministry of Defence (DS13)~~
~~Ministry of Defence (DIS)~~
~~Ministry of Aviation (Supply)~~
Department of Trade & Industry

FLO

G.6

1A/ 4057 /74

Mr. E. Downham

41111/BJF/OEH

15th October 1974.

APPLICATION FOR EXPORT LICENCE

Consignee: Ministry of Defence,
Iraq.

Business of Consignee: Government Defence

Ultimate User: Army of Iraq.

Business of Ultimate User: Government Defence Department

Agent: -

Goods: 'Cymbeline' Mortar Locating Radar and
associated items.

Purpose for which goods required: Location of Mortar

Value: £3 665 000

Route for despatch: Sea or Air Freight

Order No: 74A and S/91


B.J. Francis (Extn.2084)
Military Contracts

Please delete and return to Export Contracts

SHPO 379

1A/ 4057 /74

**EMI LIMITED,
HAYES, MIDDLESEX.**

**01-573-3888
3022**

NONE.



CS 3688

SHIPPING MANAGER.

16th October, 1974.

SHPO 379

**EMI LIMITED,
SHIPPING DIVISION,
BLYTH ROAD,
HAYES,
MIDDLESEX.
UD3 1BP.**

EMI LIMITED.

IRAQ.

'CYMBELINE' MORTAR LOCATING RADAR AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT. £3 665 000.00


**Consignee: Ministry of Defence,
Baghdad,
Iraq.**

SUBJECT TO PRICE RULING AT TIME OF SHIPMENT.

£3 665 000.00

(173)

Mr Weir



rel. despatched.

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ

1. Political approval is required for the sale of the following defence equipment, worth £36.4 m, to Iraq:-

- | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| (a) 16,000 metres of medium girder bridging equipment | £5 m |
| (b) Prefabricated aluminium surfaces for airfield runways | £3 m |
| (c) 16 Artillery sound-ranging systems | £2.4 m |
| (d) 1,250 night vision units for armoured vehicles | £26 m |

2. OPD(74)27 states that we should continue to maintain a very restrictive policy over the sale of defence equipment to Iraq, limiting supplies to minor equipment and paying close attention to Iranian and Kuwaiti susceptibilities. It further states that we should test the Shah's reactions, and inform the Kuwaitis, before deciding finally on borderline cases, and we should ensure that no equipment is supplied which might significantly increase Iraqi capabilities in any future conflict with Israel. HM Ambassador Tehran has said that he would wish to inform the Shah of any significant requests from Iraq in advance of decisions to sell.

3. The bridging equipment under consideration is the modern version of the Bailey bridge and is of no particular military consequence. The acquisition of the other three items by Iraq has some political implications in that they would marginally enhance its military capability, but the MOD view is that in no case would this enhancement be militarily significant in the context of the Arab/Israel, Iraq/Iran or Iraq/Kuwait disputes. Moreover, the aluminium runway has limitations because it is suitable only for light aircraft; and the sound-ranging system is employed in static, usually defensive, military situations (it has already been supplied by us to Syria and Libya). I would therefore regard the bridging equipment, the aluminium runway and the sound-ranging system as minor equipment and I see no objection on political grounds or in the terms of OPD(74)27 to their supply to Iraq.

/4.



4. Notwithstanding the MOD view on the night vision units, I think that the nature of the equipment and the scale of the order (1,250 units) is such that it could be a borderline case from the Iranian angle. The manufacturers, who incidentally have appealed to the Assistant Under-Secretary, Sales, in the MOD for help in getting agreement to sell it to Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, designed these units for fitting to "the older type of Russian tank", which constitutes a large part of the Iraqi tank force. While it has been accepted that the supply of these units presents no problem in Arab/Israel terms, since we have already supplied them to Egypt and Libya, it could conceivably cause the Iranians concern, even though their own armour is already well equipped in this respect. I suggest therefore that in the first instance we should seek the advice of HM Ambassador in Tehran about the desirability of sounding out the Shah before reaching a decision on supplying the night vision units.

5. If you agree, I propose to confirm political approval for the sale of the bridging, runway and sound-ranging equipment to proceed and to telegraph Mr Parsons for advice about the night vision units on the lines of the attached draft. As with the orders for Cymbeline and the Hawk, I will arrange for Defence Sales to ensure that the manufacturers do not seek publicity for any of these orders.

P R H Wright
Middle East Department

21 October 1974

cc Defence Dept

NENAD

EXPORT CREDITS GUARANTEE DEPARTMENT

PO Box No 272 Aldermanbury House Aldermanbury London EC2P 2EL

Telex 883601 Telephone 01-606 6697



I E Rich Esq
HM Treasury
Great George Street
LONDON SW1P 3AG

Your reference

Our reference
SP/A/91400/8298

Date

22 October 1974

Mr Rafferty
We have now supported
issue of Export Licence 1
chil
RSB 35/x

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 43

21 OCT 1974

Dear

IRAQ - SOUND RANGING RADIO LINK SYSTEM

We have been approached by Plessey Co. Ltd for supplier-credit cover on their prospective sale to the Government of Iraq of sixteen Sound Ranging Radio Link Systems (used for locating artillery positions) at a basic contract price of £2.4m.

The terms of payment proposed are:-

10% Cash with order

10% Six months from contract signature

80% On each delivery cash against documents in the UK

Delivery would commence 16 months from date of contract and continue at the rate of 2 systems per month until completion at month 24.

Plessey's applied for an export licence on 9 September, but as far as we know one has not yet been issued. (DoT reference LA/3604/74).


We should be grateful for your approval of our support for this business under the Section 2 Arms Account.

Yours sincerely

T W Denyer

cc G M Lambert - Bank of England
T J Wilshire - ODM
S N Chilton - DoT
ERC Holland - FCO
R J Sanders - MOD
J W Coggins } - ECGD
A A Sapsted }

CONFIDENTIAL



NBR 10/1

It was agreed with Mr. McDonald that he (175) would press MOD for final agreement to the training commitment, after which he would clear the ground with E.M.I. Once this had been done he would send his mission to Baghdad to present the deal as a "package".

NOTES FOR MEETING WITH MR McDONALD, DIRECTOR MOD "package".
SALES 1 ON WEDNESDAY, 28 OCTOBER AT 4 PM

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ

" BV in two days.

PROCEDURE

1. A form of procedure for dealing with requests for sales to Iraq has now been worked out which should facilitate decision-making on political clearance by MED. Briefly, MOD DS 13, in consultation with MED, will arrange in certain cases that in addition to the standard Arms Working Party or Release of Military Information (E) Sub-Committee clearance formalities, they will refer requests to DI (AG) 4 for military assessments of the equipment under consideration in the context of para 7 of OPD (74) 27 (ie in Arab/Israel, Iraq/Iran and Iraq/Kuwait terms). The DI (AG) 4 assessments will be sent direct to MED. MED will then proceed with their consideration on the basis of OPD (74) 27, particularly as regards Iranian susceptibilities.

GENERAL POINTS

2. i) We shall almost invariably ask the manufacturers not to seek publicity for sales to Iraq.
- ii) To meet an MOD reservation on para 7 of OPD (74) 27 (which was taken out of Committee) discretion on when to inform the Kuwaitis on sales to Iraq is left to HM Ambassador.

CYMBELINE

3. Security restrictions on the delivery of Cymbeline to Iraq will be lifted on 1 December 1975. MOD have agreed to ~~make~~ a unit of Cymbeline ~~being~~ made available to the Iraqis for training purposes in the United Kingdom in mid-October 1975*. The EMI contract was signed by the Iraqis on about 10 October but it will not be effective until EMI have an export licence. EMI submitted an application for an export licence to the DOT on 15 October. This application is not in order and DOT have asked EMI for further details.

4. There remains the problem of the delivery date vis-à-vis the Iraqis. Technically the contract allows for first delivery twelve months after receiving an export licence but if this licence is subject to a delivery restriction, then the effective date of the contract and other details, including prices, will have to be renegotiated. Moreover, the contract also states that EMI will endeavour to advance delivery of two units of Cymbeline by nine months (we know from the Defence Attaché in Baghdad that these are required for initial training).

/The

* Subject to the availability of instructions.

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- 2 -

The formal position with the Iraqis that the Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Operational Equipment asked on 24 September (i) when a licence is likely to be issued and (ii) whether there would be a restriction on first delivery. Then, on 3 October their Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Taqa, asked for a clear indication of when Cymbeline could be delivered. It was expected that at a call on the Secretary of State planned for 17 October, Mr Taqa would press for an answer, in which case we proposed to advise the Secretary of State to explain that Cymbeline is a sophisticated piece of electronic equipment over which there are security considerations affecting delivery, that we are working to keep any security restrictions within the essential limits and that so far as HMG are concerned delivery can take place in 1975. The call did not happen and subsequently Mr Taqa has died. On 15 October our Embassy in Baghdad advised us that we should tell the Iraqis now if they cannot have Cymbeline soon, although even so we would still be in trouble with them.

5. Given the Embassy view that telling the Iraqis will get us into trouble anyway, there seems to be no particular advantage in rushing into a confession now, particularly since there is bound to be some confusion in the Iraq Ministry of Foreign Affairs following the demise of Mr Taqa. It should therefore be possible to stall until the Iraqis ask again without aggravating the situation and the longer the delay the less distant the delivery date becomes; it should not be difficult to explain our tardiness in the terms of the procedures necessary for overcoming security restrictions - something which the Iraqis, with their own elaborate security machine, should appreciate. It does not seem likely that this delay would endanger the order any more than at present, as this is one of those rare cases where we have a sellers' market - there is no equivalent to Cymbeline anywhere at the moment.


6. There is still the option of making an arrangement with EMI that they should fudge the delivery business by pleading manufacturing commitments etc. This would get HMG off the hook with the Iraqis but it would mean issuing a licence and trusting EMI not to slip a Cymbeline or two through ahead of the deadline: on past performance, their trust - worthiness should not be rated too highly. In any case, given the way the contract is worded to put the responsibility on to HMG, they probably would not be agreeable to such an arrangement. Another drawback would be that the advantage of the UK training ~~facility~~ would be lost, since ~~EMI~~ could hardly offer Cymbeline for training purposes in the U.K. without being asked to explain why it could not be taken to Iraq there and then (we might possibly get round this by offering training on Med-armed Cymbelines as a gesture of good-will towards the Iraqis).

CONFIDENTIAL

(176)

Mr Wright

(164)



C

1. Reference Tehran telegram No 568.

D

2. In paragraph 4 of your minute of 21 October to Mr Weir, you suggested that we should seek the advice of HM Ambassador in Tehran about the desirability of sounding out the Shah before reaching a decision on the supply of night vision units to the Iraqis. In the event, Mr Parsons actually spoke to the Shah, who gave him the greenlight. As we had no other reservations about this sale (the Arab/Israel point being covered in your minute to Mr Weir), I think we can give political clearance without further reference. I have therefore drafted a letter for your signature to Mr Anderson, since he will probably wish to inform the manufacturers personally in view of their recent direct appeal to him.

P A Raftery
Middle East Department

29 October 1974

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35

31 OCT 1974

I S McDonald Esq
Director, Sales 1
MOD
Stuart House
Soho Square
LONDON

Your reference

Our reference NBR 10/1

Date 28 October 1974

Dear Sir,

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ

1. I am writing to inform you that we have no objection on political grounds or in the terms of OFD (74) 27 to the sale of the following equipment to Iraq:-

- a. 16,000 metres of medium girder bridging £5 million
(Grossman's letter D/Sales/113/18/1 of 7 October refers)
- b. Prefabricated aluminium surfaces for airfield runways £3 m
(Wood's letter D/Sales/523/10/12 of 16 July refers)
- c. 16 artillery sound-ranging systems £2.4 million
(DOT Export Licensing Branch Export Licence application 1A/3604/74 refers)

2. I should be most grateful if you would ensure that the manufacturers ((a) Fairey Engineering Ltd, (b) British Aluminium Company Ltd, Redditch, (c) Plessey Avionics, Ilford) do not seek publicity for any sales of these items to Iraq.

Yours sincerely,

P R H Wright

P R H Wright
Middle East Department

Cc:- A Braden Esq
DS 13
MOD

Department of Trade
Export Licensing Branch
Sanctuary Buildings
Great Smith St


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Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-



(178)

Ian MacDonald Esq CMG
Ministry of Defence (Sales)
Stuart House
Soho Square WC1

Your reference

Our reference

Date

NBR 10/1


30 October 1974

Dear Ian,

(169)

1. The Export Manager of The MEL Equipment Company wrote to Reg Anderson on 18 September (his reference D 180/3190/LGN/kg) to appeal for his help and advice over securing approval for the sale of night vision equipment to certain Arab countries, including Iraq.
2. We have consulted HM Ambassador in Tehran, who has confirmed that the Shah has no objection to the sale of this equipment to Iraq. In the light of this clearance, we in turn can confirm that we have no objection to the sale on political grounds or in the terms of OPD (74) 27. Reg Anderson may therefore wish to inform the manufacturer of this decision personally, since the Iraqi order is worth £26 m. and should go a long way towards resolving his immediate problems.
3. Could I please ask you, as with other sales to Iraq, to ensure that the manufacturer does not seek publicity? I am copying this letter to Export Licensing Branch of the Department of Trade with reference to their letter IA/3576/74 of 11 September.


P R H Wright
Middle East Department



c.c.
Ministry of Defence (DS 13)
Export Licensing Branch, Department of Trade
NENAD
Defence Department



CONFIDENTIAL



Treasury Chambers
Parliament Street London SW1P 3AG

Telex 262405

Telephone 01-930 1234 ext



(179)
(26)

T W Denyer Esq
Export Credits Guarantee Department
Aldermanbury House
Aldermanbury
LONDON EC2P 2EL

Your reference
SP/A/91400/8298

Our reference
2F(E) 17/180/01
Date

31 October 1974

IRAQ - SOUND RANGING RADIO LINK SYSTEMS (25)

You wrote to Ian Rich on 22 October about an approach from Plessey Radar Ltd for supplier credit cover on the sale of sixteen sound ranging link systems to the Government of Iraq at a cost of £2.4m.

2. Subject to the granting of an export licence I have no objections to the proposed sale on the terms detailed in your second paragraph.

A SCOTT

CC G M Lambert B/E
S N Chilton DOT
T J Wilshire ODM
E R C Holland FCO
R J Sanders MOD

Copies sent to Miss McIntosh (Def. Sales),
G.S. Burton, W92.

22
4/11

Mr. Raftery - 9 Dec 74
In 4/11

FM BAGHDAD 310705Z OCT

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

TO ROUTINE MODUK TELNO 310705Z OCTOBER.

DIG EBR/EDW.

BOMB CONTAINERS. YOUR EBR/EDW 221000Z OCT REFERS.

1. COL KHATAN DIRECTOR OF AIR SUPPLY TOLD ME THIS MORNING
THEY WANTED 500 INITIALLY OF HUNTINGS.

BL 755 CLUSTER BOMB.

2. ORIGINAL BID NUMBERS WERE THEIR OWN REFERENCE
NUMBERS.

GRAHAM

BT

SALES STUART HSE

(2) ACTION

D MARKETING

AUS (SALES)

DS 13

MD/HDS

~~MD/HDS~~

HDS

RECEIVED SALES

1 NOV 1974

REGISTRY

NNNN

RESTRICTED

Mr. The General

1b (HQA)

Enter in the

1. Halling r/n

NBR 10/1

Mr Burton
Mr Clark
Mr Wright

14 NOV 1974

HBR 16

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ

I agree that ideally we should wait until after we've conveyed the news of Cymbeline; but it would not be disastrous if we to refused the cluster bombs immediately. 18/5/74

I see no reason to wait for Cymbeline. We can soften our negative response on bombs by indicating how ready we are to supply other items, e.g. night sights etc. 18/5/74

1. In his telegram No 373, HMA Baghdad reported an inquiry from the Iraq Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs about our readiness in principle to supply two types of aerial bomb containers which the Iraqis need urgently. The DA in Baghdad has subsequently established that the actual requirement is for 500 BL755 cluster bombs.
2. Ministers agreed in June to the recommendation that we should not approve the supply of this bomb to any Arab country. When this decision was conveyed to MOD we requested that Defence Attachés in the area should be made aware of it: either this was not done in the case of Iraq or the DA in Baghdad has forgotten about it.
3. As I see it, this weapon is in a special category in which our Ministers have formed a policy of no sale to any Arab country and we do not therefore have to make an assessment in the terms of OPD (74) 27 as regards its sale to Iraq. There is, however, the consideration of when and how to tell the Iraqis. Given that their Minister asked for our agreement in principle, it would seem that they half-expected a negative answer anyway and I think we should tell them frankly that it is not in keeping with our policy to sell them this offensive weapon. On timing, there is the complication of the Cymbeline transaction. We are hoping to smooth over the delivery restriction on Cymbeline by offering a training package in this country, but even so it will take some selling and perhaps one should try to avoid giving the answer on the BL 755 until this business has been done (we are waiting for Army agreement to the provision of instructors, which is proving to be rather difficult). Ian McDonald would like to talk this over with us when he pays a briefing visit here next week prior to his departure for the Gulf.
4. Mr McDonald is also likely to raise the argument about the FCO ban on the BL 755 in the Arab world, which as you know he contested some months ago and on which he aims to put forward

x I have since heard from MOD that they did not do this.

Q.

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a case to get the decision revised. He is not going to select Iraq as the test-case but he will no doubt try out some of his arguments in the Iraqi context just to see how we react. My guess is that he will wait for the Omanis to ask for this bomb, since it is a standard weapon for the Jaguar aircraft, before he makes his move.

P A Raftery
Middle East Dept

5 November 1974

I think in some giving a guide (not of course negative)

reply to the basis. Delay could give the impression

that we have engaged in some agonising consideration

of the problem - it is surely better to indicate that

any further delay is ruled out. By all means let

us open the door by a response to night - rights.

2. A man could be a case for maximal treatment

(subject of course to mutual agreement); but please

remember that we are not in a position to make

or stimulate or encourage - eg. by demonstration.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



RECEIVED
BRITISH EMBASSY
KUWAIT

5 November 1974

P R H Wright Esq
Middle East Dept
FCO

Dear Parnik,

ARMS SALES TO IRAQ

(16) 1. Please refer to FCO telegram No 428 of 22 October to Tehran about arms sales to Iraq.

2. I will hold off telling the Kuwait Government about Cymbeline until the order is absolutely firm. But perhaps you will ensure that I am sent a telegram when this is so. I will then also tell them about the other orders mentioned in paragraph 2 of the telegram under reference.

Yours sincerely,

A T Lamb

A T Lamb

9M 11/11
Please find a copy to Mr. MacDonald, (No 1) Sales

CONFIDENTIAL

1, Smart House.

28/11



Head of DS 13

Ministry of Defence
Main Building,
Whitehall,
LONDON SW1

Your reference

Our reference NBR 10/1

Date 7 November 1974

Mr Hugh,

SALE OF BL 755 CLUSTER BOMB TO IRAQ

1. I should be grateful for comments or clearance on the attached draft telegram to Baghdad by noon, Friday 8 November.

Yours.
P A Raftery

Middle East Department

c.c. Director of Sales 1, MOD, Stuart House
Mr Williams, NENAD
Miss McIntosh, Defence Department

has cleared, though she thought MOD would insist on the insertion of "F.O." before "Minister" in para 1. In the event they did not mention covering CONFIDENTIAL this point.

Mr. Raftery

fine by me. But I shall be surprised if you get away with it!

M
8/11

Mr McDonald has given verbal clearance, subject to Mr Braden's views. Mr Braden has suggested an amendment to the last sentence of para 2 to put the decision in the Arab Israel context rather than just the Middle East as such, since this could be taken to include Iraq. R/P

Mr Clark 8/11
Mr Wright

The draft below has been amended to meet Mr. Braden's point.

I. Lally
8/11

Lord. But let us delete "substantive".
7/11

Mr. Raftery again
(tel. call to)

File No.

Department Middle East
Drafted by
(Block Capitals) P A Raftery

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence

PRIORITY IMMEDIATE

Tel. Extn. MA 16

DESKBY Z

FOR
COMMS. DEPT.
USE

Despatched

(Date)

(Time) Z

POSTBY Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) 6/11 Z(G.M.T.)

(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL

(Codeword)

(Restrictive Prefix)

(Caveat/
Privacy Marking)

(Deskby) Z

TO PRIORITY IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD Tel. No. of
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info)

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

Files

MED

Defence Dept

NENAD

Mr Weir

A

B

C

[TEXT]

Your telegram No 373: Defence Sales

1. As reported by your Defence Attache's telegram No 310705Z Oct, the Iraqis appear to be interested in the BL 755 Cluster Bomb. If so, we are not able to assist because Ministers have ruled against the supply of this weapon to Israel and any Arab country.

2. We are anxious to avoid giving the Iraqis the impression that their request has involved us in any agonising consideration. You should therefore speak to the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs at the earliest opportunity to the effect that we had had to delay a reply to his request until the relevant bomb containers had been identified by the Iraqi Air Force. Now that it had become clear from what the Iraqi Director of Air Supply told your Defence Attache that these articles were in

CONFIDENTIAL

/fact

Copies to:-

MOD DS 13
Director of Sales
I MOD

CONFIDENTIAL

fact BL 755 Cluster bombs, you are instructed to say
that ~~the supply of this weapon would be inconsistent with our~~
~~that we do not supply this weapon to the Middle East.~~
~~policy towards arms sales to the Middle East.~~

3. If you think it would help to soften the impact
of this response, you may draw attention to our recent
approval for the supply of several substantial orders
of defence equipment to Iraq, viz the four items
listed in paragraph 2 of our telegram No 428 to
Tehran, as evidence of our willingness to meet Iraqi
requirements when we can.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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U/SR

LH 384E





MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation Defence Sales 1b

Stuart House 23 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ

Telex 23805

Telephone 01-437-9288-9289
Direct Line 01-632 4708
Switchboard 632 3333



Your reference

Miss M R McIntosh
Defence Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Our reference

D/Sales/113/48/3

Date D/Sales 113/18/1

8th November 1974

Dear Miriam

ARMS WORKING PARTY CLEARANCES

Could we have an indication of your Department's view to the sale of the equipment described below please?

- 1 Country: IRAQ
- 2 Description of equipment:

A IRIS: Infra-Red Intruder System. The basis of this system is that an infra-red beam is projected between a transmitter and a sensor: Interruption of the beam causes an alarm to be triggered at a remote monitoring unit. IRIS can be used at day or night, and over a range of 200M in average conditions, and in fog, snow or tropical rain a range of 50 M can be reached.

B TOBIAS Terrestrial Oscillation Battlefield Intruder Alarm System. TOBIAS is designed to provide a small easily portable all weather day and night surveillance system which does not need line-of-sight conditions.

- 3 Security classification of equipment: UNCLASSIFIED

- 4 Further information The equipment is manufactured by Marconi-Elliott Avionic Systems Ltd.

I am copying this letter to the other members of the AWP.

Yours sincerely

Christine Lamb

C LAMB (Miss)

Copies to:-

Mr H R Braden - DS13 Mr M Esau - DS13b
Mr W P Cassell - Treasury
Mr P T Durnell - DoT (EPB)
Lt Col G W A Napier - DPS (C Team)

Min M R McIntosh.

No MED objection.

*hello to me)
chuck
24/2.*

I. Hall 21/2/75

*Mr. D. [unclear]
Mr. [unclear]
Grateful for your
comments etc.*

11.11.74.

CONFIDENTIAL

LOOSE MINUTE

A/43/0'seas/2533 AT1 (F&C)

DS 13

Copies:

HQ DRA

MAO

MDS2

Sales 1b

FCO (Mideast Dept) ✓

CYMBELINE TO IRAQ

Reference: Your D/DS 13/709/19 dated 16 SEP '74 (not to all)

1. To fill in the six weeks gap between the firm's contract date of delivery (mid October 1975) and the permitted delivery date in December 1975 the Royal School of Artillery should be able, without detriment to British army training, to arrange a suitable Cymbeline conversion course for six Iraqis, provided no task with a higher priority is given to the School for that period in the meantime, and provided that the Iraqi students are up to the following starting standards:

- a. a knowledge of maths, logs, map reading/survey up to the standard of Regimental Surveyor Class 3;
- b. very good English;
- c. ability to operate a radio.

2. It is suggested that this class contains one officer and five senior NCOs (potential instructors). The Course would assemble in early October and end in early December, provided the above starting standards have been achieved.

3. It is noted that the Iraqi Cymbeline equipment may be used for this instruction and will be made available for it.

8 November 1974

A. Thomson
R 3

A THOMSON
AT1 (F&C)
WH 265 0892MB

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER/CAT A

FM F C O 081645Z

CONFIDENTIAL

NBR 10/1
(185)

TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELNO 287 OF 8 NOVEMBER 1974.

YOUR TELNO. 373: DEFENCE SALES.

1. AS REPORTED BY YOUR DEFENCE ATTACHE'S TELNO. 310705Z OCT., THE IRAQIS APPEAR TO BE INTERESTED IN THE BL 755 CLUSTER BOMB. IF SO, WE ARE NOT ABLE TO ASSIST BECAUSE MINISTERS HAVE RULED AGAINST THE SUPPLY OF THIS WEAPON TO ISRAEL AND ANY ARAB COUNTRY.
2. WE ARE ANXIOUS TO AVOID GIVING THE IRAQIS THE IMPRESSION THAT THEIR REQUEST HAS INVOLVED US IN ANY AGONISING CONSIDERATION. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE SPEAK TO THE ACTING MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO THE EFFECT THAT WE HAD HAD TO DELAY A REPLY TO HIS REQUEST UNTIL THE RELEVANT BOMB CONTAINERS HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED BY THE IRAQI AIR FORCE. NOW THAT IT HAD BECOME CLEAR FROM WHAT THE IRAQI DIRECTOR OF AIR SUPPLY TOLD YOUR DEFENCE ATTACHE THAT THESE ARTICLES WERE IN FACT BL 755 CLUSTER BOMBS, YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO SAY THAT THE SUPPLY OF THIS WEAPON WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH OUR POLICY TOWARDS ARMS SALES TO THE MIDDLE EAST.
3. IF YOU THINK IT WOULD HELP TO SOFTEN THE IMPACT OF THIS RESPONSE, YOU MAY DRAW ATTENTION TO OUR RECENT APPROVAL FOR THE SUPPLY OF SEVERAL ORDERS OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT TO IRAQ, VIZ THE FOUR ITEMS LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF OUR TELNO. 428 TO TEHRAN, AS EVIDENCE OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO MEET IRAQI REQUIREMENTS WHEN WE CAN.

CALLAGHAN

FILES

MED

DEFENCE

NENAD

MR CAMPBELL

MR NEIR

SIR G ARTHUR
MR THOMSON

COPIES TO

DS 13

DIRECTOR SALES 13

} MOD

CONFIDENTIAL

TO DEFATN ILAT BAGHDAD

INFO FCO (ME DEPT)

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

SIG EDB

ADVANCE COPY

8 NOV 1974

NBR 10/1

Mr. Bafferty

Encl. FIA K14

(166) FOR DA FROM MCDONALD D SALES 1. YOUR 270930Z OCT. DEFENCE
IRAQ. APPRECIATE YOUR CONCERN TO BE KEPT FULLY IN PICTURE ON DEFENCE
EQUIPMENT ITEMS RAISED BY IRAQ. AS YOU SUGGEST WE IN DEFENCE SALES
ALSO DO NOT ALWAYS HEAR OF EQUIPMENT SALES BEING PURSUED SEPARATELY
BY FIRMS. IN CASE OF SOUND RANGING SYSTEM AND NIGHT VISION UNITS WE
HEARD ONLY AT EXPORT LICENCE STAGE WHEN QUERY AROSE.

TOW. SOUND RANGING SYSTEM IS FOR TWELVE FLESSEY SYSTEMS AND
DECISION EXPECTED ON EXPORT LICENCE SHORTLY. NIGHT VISION UNITS ARE
MEL PASSIVE DRIVING PERISCOPES AND INFRA RED SYSTEMS. WE ARE TOLD
THIS COVERS 1250 SETS AT VALUE APPROX 26 (TWENTY SIX) MILLION
STERLING. MEL NOW HAVE CLEARANCE TO SUPPLY.

THREE. CLEARANCE FOR GAZELLE AND LYNX BEING PROCESSED. WILL ADVISE
YOU OF OUTCOME. WESTLANDS TOLD US SEVEN IRAQI OFFICERS LED BY CHIEF
PURCHASING OFFICER INTEND VISITING FACTORY TO SEE LYNX PRODUCTION.

AEROSPATIALE HAVE TOLD WESTLANDS THAT IRAQ HAVE SIGNED CONTRACT WITH
FRENCH FOR 30 GAZELLES BUT WE DO NOT KNOW HOW RELIABLE THIS INFO IS
ADDITIONALLY FRENCH SAY ARMAMENT FOR LYNX AND GAZELLE WOULD BE
SUPPLIED FROM FRANCE.

FOUR. HSA STATE THEY HAVE ONLY RECEIVED SINGLE HAWK ENQUIRY FROM
IRAQ AND THAT WAS FROM THEIR MA LONDON ON 8 OCT. FIRM SUBMITTED OFFER
FOR 40 AIRCRAFT ON 21 OCT TO LONDON EMBASSY AND STATED WILLINGNESS
TO GO TO BAGHDAD TO DISCUSS FURTHER. FRANK MURPHY MILITARY SALES
DIRECTOR HAS WRITTEN PERSONAL LETTER TO VICE PRESIDENT SADDAM
HUSSEIN SPEAKING OF HAWK IN GENERAL TERMS AND OFFERING TO VISIT IRAQ.
FOR HSA INFO CAN YOU PLEASE STATE ALPHA NAME OF DIRECTOR OF AIR SUPPLY
BRAVO POSITION NOW HELD BY COLONEL MUMTAZ SAADDUN PREVIOUSLY DIRECTOR
OF AIR ACADEMY AT MOSUL.

FIVE. AGREE WITH YOU THAT WE RUN DANGER OF IRAQ TURNING ELSEWHERE IF
WE CANNOT RESPOND BUT OF COURSE WE ARE ABLE TO WORK ONLY WITHIN
POLICY LINES LAID DOWN FOR US. THIS NECESSARILY LIMITS HOW FAR WE
AND YOU CAN QUOTE ACTIVELY ENGAGE IN WHAT IS A POTENTIALLY VERY
REAL MARKET UNQUOTE. I AWAIT WITH INTEREST THE LETTER YOU PROMISED
ON THE SUBJECT

BT

GRS 25

CONFIDENTIAL

NBR 10/1
TOP COPY (187)

IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CATEGORY A

Telegrammer.

E+H.A.

FM BAGHDAD 101000Z NOV

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 110600Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 413 OF 10 NOVEMBER. 1974

YOUR TELNO 287 : DEFENCE SALES

MAY I ALSO SAY THAT WE WOULD NOT (NOT) SUPPLY THIS WEAPON
TO IRAN?

GRATEFUL FOR EARLY REPLY.

GRAHAM

FILES

ME D

DEFENCE D

NENAD

MR. CAMPBELL

MR. WEIR

SIR G. ARTHUR

MR. THOMSON

COPIES TO


DS 13

DIRECTOR SALES 1

MOD

CONFIDENTIAL

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(188)
TOP COPY

!A. L12711

GR 35
IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A

FM FCO 111615Z

(NBR 10/)

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELNO 291 OF 11 NOVEMBER 1974
YOUR TELNO 413: BL 755 CLUSTER BOMB

1. THIS IS NOT THE CASE. STRICTLY FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION,
WE WOULD EXPECT TO HAVE NO OBJECTIONS TO SUPPLYING IRAN WITH
THIS WEAPON, BUT TO DATE THE IRANIANS HAVE DONE NO MORE THAN
EXPRESS INTEREST IN IT

CALLAGHAN

FILES

MED
DEF D
NENAD
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR
SIR G ARTHUR
MR THOMSON

COPIES TO

DS13
DIRECTOR SALES 1 } MOD
DIRECTOR SALES 4 }


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GRS 110/2

EN CLAIR

FM BAGHDAD 120535Z NOV

UNCLASSIFIED



(189)

E+1A

12/11

TO ROUTINE MODUK TELNO 120535Z NOV INFO ROUTINE FCO.

DIG EBR

MODUK FOR SALES 1B. FCO FOR MED. FROM DA.
WESTLAND SERVICE SUPPORT FOR IRAQI WESSEX.

ONE. QUOTATION SENT BY MR PARDOE WESTLANDS TO IAF FOR SERVICES
OF TWO FITTERS AND ONE SERVICE ENGINEER TO REPAIR THREE
WESSEX HELICOPTERS NOT UNDERSTOOD BY IAF.

TWO. PLEASE ASK WESTLANDS TO CONFIRM THAT TWENTY DAY PERIOD
ESTIMATED FOR REPAIRS WILL COST IRAQIS STERLING TWENTYFIVE
POUNDS PER DAY PER MAN EXCLUDING COST OF AIRFARE, TRAVEL WITHIN
IRAQ AND MEDICAL AND DENTAL TREATMENT AND MATERIALS AND PARTS.
WILL COST STERLING ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED AND TWENTY
SIX POUNDS.

GRAHAM

FILES
MED
DEFENCE DEPT
MR WEIR
MR THOMSON

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD 120545Z
CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY MODUK 120545Z NOVEMBER 1974 INFO ROUTINE FCO.

DIG EDB

FROM DA FOR MACDONALD D SALES. FCO (MED).

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ.

YOUR EDB 061245Z NOV REFERS.

ONE. RETURNED FROM COURSE IN BEIRUT YESTERDAY. MANY THANKS
YOUR HELPFUL AND ENCOURAGING TEL.

TWO. WESTLANDS YOUR PARA 3 REFERS PLEASE PASS TO WESTLANDS.
DIR OF AIR SUPPLY COL KHATAN AZZAWI WILL LEAD DELEGATION, WILL
NOT NOW ARRIVE LONDON UNTIL 24 NOV. PLEASE ALSO PASS TO
ROLLS ROYCE AND BAC MISSILE DIVISION WHOM THEY INTEND VISITING
AFTER WESTLANDS.

THREE. COL KHATAN TELLS ME THEY HAVE NOT YET SIGNED CONTRACT
WITH FRENCH FOR 30 GAZELLES, AND WILL MAKE DECISION AFTER
VISIT TO WESTLANDS. ARE THE FRENCH NOW POACHING IN OUR
TERRITORY?

FOUR. HSA. YOUR PARA FOUR REFERS.

IRAQIS PLEASED ABOUT NEWS WHICH CLEARLY NOT PASSED TO THEM
BY THEIR LONDON EMBASSY. LONDON MA HAS BEEN SACKED AND OUR
EXPERIENCE TO DATE IS HE IS QUITE USELESS. A VIEW SHARED BY
IRAQ MOD. HAVE GIVEN FRANK MURPHY'S NAME TO KHATAN BUT SUGGEST
HE CONTACTS KHATAN AT WESTLANDS TO FIX MEETING.


FIVE. COL MUMTAZ SAADUN STILL COMD AIR ACADEMY BELIEVED
NOW MOVED TO TIKRIT.

SIX. HAVING CLEARED BACKLOG AFTER ABSENCE PROMISED LETTER
WILL FOLLOW.

GRAHAM

FILES
MED
DEFENCE DEPT
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR
MR THOMSON

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

EHA

(191)
R 14/11

D/DIS/5/5/12

DS 13b

Copy to:
Head DS 13
FCO(MED) ✓
FCO(Defence Dept)



IRAQ: SALE OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT.

Ref: D/DS 13/178/38 of 16 October 1974)

1. You requested at reference a military assessment of the extent by which Iraqi military capabilities would be increased in a future conflict with Israel, were they to acquire the following equipments:-

- a. Medium Girder Bridges - 18 sets ✓
- b. 16 Sound Ranging Systems. ✓
- c. Clansmen UK/VRC 353/4 - 100 sets.
- d. Transportable tropospheric scatter systems: 4-6 mobile stations.

2. The equipments at 1a)-c) are all of minor significance which, in our view, would not significantly increase Iraqi military capabilities in any future conflict with Israel.

3. The importance of the equipments at 1d) above is more difficult to assess. There was comparatively little communication between the various national Arab armies during the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, due in part to the lack of suitable equipment, and in part also to the vagaries of the Arab character. We do not know what equipment Iraq currently holds for long distance higher formation multi-channel communication. The sale of tropospheric scatter equipment could considerably increase her capability in this respect, if other Arab states likely to be involved in a future conflict with Israel also purchased or gained access to this or a compatible system. We have no evidence at present that Iraq's Arab allies have compatible equipment or are seeking it.

J CUNNINGHAM
DI(AG) 4

13 Nov 74

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(192)

GRS 105

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 130445Z NOV.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 14/11/74 NBR 10/1

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E-1A

(14/11)

R-E S T R I C T E D

TO ROUTINE MODUK TEL OF 13 NOVEMBER 1974, INFO
ROUTINE FCO.

DIG EBR/LPE/FOH.
FROM DA.

HELICOPTER SALES TO IRAQ.

ONE. FRENCH MA TODAY INFORMED ME IRAQIS NOW HAVE TOTAL
OF FORTY ALOUETTES. REQUEST BY IRAQIS TO PURCHASE MORE
AT LAST YEARS PRICE REJECTED BY FRENCH. MA SAYS FUTURE
SALES UNLIKELY.

TWO. AEROSPATIALE SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME IN LAST TWO
MONTHS TRYING TO CONCLUDE SALE OF PUMAS BUT IRAQIS HAVE
NOW REFUSED DEAL AS BEING TOO EXPENSIVE WHEN THEY CAN GET
M18'S CHEAPER.

THREE. IRAQIS CLEARLY NOW INTERESTED IN LYNX AND GAZELLE
BUT WILL NOT GO FIRM ON FRENCH OFFER ON GAZELLE UNTIL AFTER
VISIT TO WESTLANDS STARTING 24 NOV.

GRAHAM

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

FILES
MED
DEFENCE D
MR WEIR
MR THOMSON

RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-

193

D A Grossman Esq
Sales 1b
Ministry of Defence
Stuart House

Your reference

Our reference NBR 10/1

Date 29 October 1974

Dear David,

1. Thank you for your letter D/Sales/113/18/1//
113/112/3 of 16 October 1974.
2. There is no political objection to the
release of information on and eventual supply
of Combat Engineer Tractor (FV 180) to Iraq.
3. I am copying this letter to the other members
of the Arms Working Party.

Yours ever
C G Lane

C G LANE
Defence Department

To L 0548²/11
(194)

+ 4x

Reply sent -

FCO NR 627/E032/11

LKS 220/10

OO FCO

GRS 25

CYPHER CATEGORY A

DESKBY 110600Z

FM BAGHDAD 101000Z NOV

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 110600Z

ADVANCE COPY

Lin G. Arthur

M. Thomson

H. H. H.

-- Defence

R C (free)

Mr Wright.

Drop reply attached.

I. H. H. H.

Mr. Rafter

I think the answer is No, but is it?

Imagine that as night.

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 413 OF 10 NOVEMBER.

YOUR TELNO 287 : DEFENCE SALES

MAY I ALSO SAY THAT WE WOULD NOT (NOT) SUPPLY THIS WEAPON
TO IRAN?

GRATEFUL FOR EARLY REPLY.

GRAHAM

NNNN



Security
Classification

----- 15 spaces ----->

CONFIDENTIAL

Message
Instructions

----- 15 spaces ----->

AMRAD

195

SIGNAL

MESSAGE

FORM

18 NOV 1974

NBR 1611

USE A

SEPARATE

LINE

FOR

EACH

ADDRESSEE

Precedences

ACTION/

DTG

FROM

*TO

*INFO

ROUTINE

121615

Z

Month

NOV

MOD UK

BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD

- 3--
spaces

FCO

R+HA

LK/11

Line Feed

TEXT Security
Classification

DIG(s) Only

CONFIDENTIAL

Special Handling Caveat Only

DIG RBH/RBV

FOR DA FROM MDS 2

REF. YOUR 111002Z NOV.

YOUR 310700Z OCT NOT RECEIVED BY MDS 2 (.) COPY
NOW OBTAINED FROM SALES 1 (.) NOT POSSIBLE TO
ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS IMMEDIATELY (.) DUE TO
FAILURE OF IRAQIS TO RESPOND IN REASONABLE TIME TO
OFFERS MADE IN JUNE AND THEIR PRECIPITATE
WITHDRAWAL OF OFFICERS FROM BLANDFORD COURSE
IN JULY IT IS NOW NECESSARY TO RE-EXAMINE WHAT
CAN BE OFFERED (.) WILL ADVISE AS SOON AS

Special Distribution
See note 9

File Reference

DRAFTER'S NAME
(Block letters)

Extension

Branch

RELEASING OFFICER'S
SignaturePage 1 of 2
PagesHave you referred to a
classified message ?
(Answer YES or NO in box)

YES

Grade/
RankName
(Block letters)Security
Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

PRECEDENCE— Action / Info	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	DATE—TIME—GROUP	MOD FORM 140A (continuation sheet)
ROUTINE	CONF.	121615Z NOV	

RELEVANT ESTABLISHMENTS HAVE BEEN
CONSULTED (.)

Special Distribution See note 9		File Reference	MD/HDS/75/1
		DRAFTER'S NAME (Block letters)	H. CAMERON
		Extension	3466
		Branch	MDS 2
		RELEASING OFFICER'S Signature	H. Cameron
Page 2 of 2 Pages	Have you referred to a classified message? (Answer YES or NO in box)	Grade/ Rank	Name (Block letters)
	YES	SEO	H. CAMERON

196

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RECEIVED IN REGISTER N 35 15 NOV 1974 NBR 10/1

E + 1A.

14/11

RESTRICTED

CYPHER CAT A
ROUTINE 130845Z NOV 1974
FM MODUK
TO BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD
INFO FCO MED

R E S T R I C T E D
DIG EBR/LPE

FROM SALES 1B PD ENGINEER EQUIPMENT PD FURTHER TO YOUR 100730Z OCT
PARA 2 AND MDS3 181530 PARA 4 CMM CLEARANCE TO SUPPLY COMBAT
ENGINEER TRACTOR AND POWER RAFT CLASS 16 HAS BEEN OBTAINED PD MOD
SALES SUPPLY AND LAIRD (ANGLESEY) LTD RESPECTIVELY PREPARING
QUOTATIONS PD GRATEFUL YOU ADVISE FORMAL TITLE AND ADDRESS OF
DIRECTURATE OF ARMAMENT AND SUPPLIES PD ARE YOU WILLING TO
FORWARD COMBAT ENG TRACTOR QUOTATION PLEASE

F I L E S
MED
DEFENCE D

RESTRICTED

00 MODUK

GRS 400

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 130920Z NOV

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK TEL NO 130920Z NOVEMBER.

DIG OGU.

FROM DA FOR MDS 3 GRIFFIN.
IRAQI ENGRS VISIT TO UK.

ONE. HAVING PERSUADED IRAQIS WITH DIFFICULTY VERBALLY AND IN WRITING TO POSTPONE THEIR VISIT UNTIL 20 NOV (MY 161030Z OCT AND YOUR 181530Z OCT REFER) SUBSEQUENT ATTEMPTS TO BRING FORWARD THEIR DATES AGAIN (YOUR 21 1525Z OCT AND 311545Z OCT REFER) WERE UNDERMINED BY OUR INABILITY TO GET VISA CLEARANCE FOR THEM IN TIME FOR A REVISED ETA OF 11 NOV.

TWO. AS THEY THEN CONFIRMED VISIT 20-28 NOV (OUR 090930Z NOV REFERS) YOUR 091825Z NOV ARRIVED CLEARLY SHOWING IMPORTANCE OF DATES BEING BROUGHT FORWARD.

THREE. HAVING GOT OUR AUTHORITIES TO ARRANGE QUICK VISA ISSUE BASED ON COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND AGREEMENT OF W. GERMANS TO ISSUE IMMEDIATE VISAS THEN ATTEMPTED THREE TIMES TO GET DATES BROUGHT FORWARD TO EITHER ETA UK 16 NOV OR ETA DUESSELDORF 17 NOV (YOUR 111605Z NOV REFERS).

FOUR. CONTENTS OF PARA 3 OF MY 091825Z REFERS AND TO BRING FORWARD DATES BY 3 DAYS REQUIRES COMPLETELY FRESH START FOR THESE CLEARANCES. ENGRS ALSO HEAVILY INVOLVED IN KURDISH ISSUE WHICH MAY HAVE MEANT FURTHER COMPLICATIONS.

FIVE. ALTHOUGH PITY TO MISS DEMOS DO NOT AGREE. THERE IS NO POINT IN COMINGL AS IRAQIS STILL WANT TO SEE FAIREYS WHO ISSUED ORIGINAL INVITATION. CAN PROPOSED VISITS IN YOUR 311550Z OCT NOT GO AHEAD. TO CANCEL WOULD BE EMBARRASSING.

U.S. AIR FORCE
RECEIVED
15 NOV 1974
NBR 10/1

Mr. R. A. T. O. R. Y

I have made it clear to Defense Sales that these visitors are not to be encouraged to believe that they can buy all they are shown.

E-1A

(14/1)

FIVE. ALTHOUGH PITY TO MISS DEMOS DO NOT AGREE. THERE IS NO POINT IN COMING AS IRAQIS STILL WANT TO SEE FAIREYS WHO ISSUED ORIGINAL INVITATION. CAN PROPOSED VISITS IN YOUR 311550Z OCT NOT GO AHEAD. TO CANCEL WOULD BE EMBARRASSING.

SIX. PARTY NOW REDUCED TO THREE WHO ARE COL ABDUL, MAJ FARUQ AND CAPT TARIQ.

SEVEN. INTENSELY FRUSTRATING WORKING WITH IRAQIS BUT THEY BADLY NEED ALL TYPES OF ENGR EQPT URGENTLY AND HAVE CASH TO PAY. GOD HELPS THOSE WHO HELP THEMSELVES BUT PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS ARE NOT TRUSTED HERE AND THEY ARE EQUALLY FRUSTRATED BY THEIR OWN BEAUROCRACY AND REQUIREMENTS OF DGI.

GRAHAM

BT

NNNN

MET

1238

FO 084/E 74/13

M

LKS NR 255/13

RR MODUK

GRS 60

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 130445Z NOV.

S E C R E T


TO ROUTINE MODUK TEL OF 13 NOVEMBER 1974.

DIG FOH.
FROM DA.

WESTLAND ENGR VISIT TO REPAIR IRAQI WESSEX.

ONE. WESTLANDS INTEND SENDING SERVICE ENGINEER AND TWO FITTERS
TO REPAIR WESSEX IN IRAQ.TWO. CAN THESE MEN BE PROPERLY BRIEFED BEFORE DEPARTURE AND
IF POSSIBLE CONTACT ME ON ARRIVAL THROUGH ANYONE AT NEW BRITISH
CLUB.

THREE. CONTACT AT WESTLANDS IS MR. PARDOE.

GRAHAM
BTMr. Rastody

They are not clear what is
intended by former. They are
querying it with Baghdad.
ETRA. L.L.

SENT INES

1047/13
(199)

MOD DISTRIBUTION

~~MED~~

FO 098/E 052/13

LKS 269/13

OO MODUK

GRS 45

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 131005Z NOV

RESTRICTED

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK TELNO 131000Z NOV.

DIG OGU.

FROM DA FOR MDS 3 GRIFFIN.

ONE. THREE IRAQI ENGINEER OFFERS NOW ARRIVING UK 17 NOV.
UNABLE TO GET PERMISSION TO GO TO GERMANY. WILL SIGNAL
FLT NO. AND ETA LATER. NIL DESPERANDI. I NEVER DO.

GRAHAM

BT

NNNN



Mr. Rastey

E + P.A. L1411

(200)

HA of Defence (2)

~~HA of DEF~~

RECU REGIS
15 NOV 1974
NBRP

MI
CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 130445Z NOV.

R E S T R I C T E D

TO ROUTINE MODUK TEL OF 13 NOVEMBER 1974, INFO
ROUTINE FCO.

DIG EBR/LPE/FOH.
FROM DA.

HELICOPTER SALES TO IRAQ.

ONE. FRENCH MA TODAY INFORMED ME IRAQIS NOW HAVE TOTAL
OF FORTY ALOUETTES. REQUEST BY IRAQIS TO PURCHASE MORE
AT LAST YEARS PRICE REJECTED BY FRENCH. MA SAYS FUTURE
SALES UNLIKELY.

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VISIT TO WESTLANDS STARTING 24 NOV.

GRAHAM
BT

Mr. Raftery

R+LA.

14/11

Government Clearances With Regard To The Sale Of UK Arms To Iraq. UK Arms Sales To Iraq. 19 Aug. 1974. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 8/2322. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107472986/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=8dcc4ad4&pg=1. Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.